Consider a pure-exchange general equilibrium model with two consumers, two goods and an initial endowment. Assuming that consumers have convex preferences, a Pareto improvement can be achieved through exchange: As long as indifference curves associated with the endowment are tangent to each other on the Edgeworth box. а. b. As long as indifference curves associated with the endowment are not tangent to each other on the Edgeworth box. C. Only when one of the consumers has no endowment of one of the goods. d. Only when the initial endowment is on the contract curve.
Q: 2. General Equilibrium. consumers, each with the same Cobb-Douglas preferences except with differ-…
A: There are two consumers : i = 1 ,2 Two goods : j = 1,2 Utility function for consumer 1 : u1(x11 ,…
Q: Problem 2. (Equilibrium with Intertemporal Choice) Consider an intertemporal choice problem with…
A: Given information there are 2 consumers Ambrosia and Fergus Initial endowment of Ambrosia WA=(4,1)…
Q: A consumer's preferences over quantities of goods x1,x2 20 are represented by the utility function…
A: Utility Function : U = min {2x1 , x2 } Endowments : w = (3 , 8 ) Price of good (x2) = 3 Price of…
Q: Rosa received a corgi pillow as a raffle prize; she would have been willing to pay $18 to buy it…
A:
Q: A maximizing consumer is endowed with gh= 20, 5h= 20 and has preferences described by the linear…
A: Answer; Given data;
Q: by comp iven an appropriate endowment. Do so by identifying an initial endowment point, b, located…
A: D. both consumers have the same marginal rate of substitution at bundle b.
Q: 3. (a) If each consumer's utility function is continuous, strongly increasing, and strictly quasi…
A: Marginal cost (MC) is the expenditure of one more unit of outcome. The notion is accustomed to…
Q: Suppose there are 3 agents i E{1, 2, 3} with preferences over 3 objects j E{a, b, c} as follows:…
A: The shares of a corporation are units of equity ownership. For certain businesses, shares serve as a…
Q: Alice (A) and Bob (B) have an endowment of goods 1 and 2, with Alice's endowment being (wt, w) =…
A: A Walrasian equilibrium is a set of prices and a consumption bundle for each agent in which I each…
Q: function u (c, m) = c + m + µ (c − rc) + µ (m − rm) where rc is his cake reference point, rm is his…
A: *Answer: In economics, preference is the request that a specialist provides for options in light of…
Q: c.
A: An edge worth box diagram is a graphical representation of a market showing two commodities, say for…
Q: Suppose persons A and B have Cobb-Douglas preferences yielding the following individual demand…
A: Walrus law states that : p1z1p1,p2 + p2z2p1,p2 = 0 That is, value of aggregate excess demand is…
Q: Question 2 Demonstrate, by way of example, and explain fully, taking noting of the underlying…
A: Hicksian demand functions are useful for isolating the effect of relative prices on quantities…
Q: Suppose there are two consumers, A and B. The utility functions of each consumer are given by:…
A:
Q: Suppose there are 3 agents i E(1, 2, 3) with preferences over 3 objects j e(a, b, c) as follows:…
A:
Q: Which of the following statements is not true about the utility possibilities frontier It shows…
A: 3. Utility possibilities frontier shows utility levels that are attainable It shows the utility each…
Q: Let preferences of both individuals be given by log(ci)+ log(c). Suppose that the endowment vectors…
A: Market supply of both the goods are the sum of endowments.
Q: James's preferences over cake, c, and money, m, can be represented by the utility function u (c, m)…
A: In economics, preference is the request that a specialist provides for options in light of their…
Q: Bluth’s preferences for paper and houses can be expressed as Ub(p, h) = 2pb + hb, while Scott’s…
A: Given information Bluth’s utility function Ub=2pb + hb Scott’s utility function Us= ps + 2bs…
Q: Q5 In a two-period model, suppose that a consumer's utility function is: U(C₁, C₂) = log(c₁) +…
A: Utility function : U(c1, c2 ) = log (c1) + log(c2) Period 1 Budget constraint - c1 + S = Y1…
Q: 2. Diana and Jennie are stranded on a desert island. Each has in his possession some slices of ham…
A: An Edgeworth box is a graphical depiction of a market with just two goods, X and Y, and two…
Q: Chris and Dana live in an exchange economy with two goods: good Q and good R. Chris starts off with…
A: Introduction Chris and Dana live an exchange economy with two goods Q and R. Chris has Unit of Q = 6…
Q: A and B are both currently single. They are deciding whether or not they should get married and…
A: Option d is correct answer
Q: 2. Let two consumers have preferences described by the utility function: U* =log(x",)+log(x"2),…
A:
Q: 2B. The preference relation of a consumer is representable by an utility function u(z, y)…
A: We have given perfect substitute production function where x and y are consumed in a fixed…
Q: 7. Consider an economy where identical agents (of mass 1) live for two periods: youth (period 1) and…
A: The question is based on Samuelson and Diamond's Overlapping Generations Model (OLG). Each agent…
Q: According to the Koszegi-Rabin model, people's reference points are determined by their recent…
A: The endowment impact describes a circumstance during which a personal places a better worth on AN…
Q: A and B are both currently single. They are deciding whether or not they should get married and…
A: There are two individuals A & B Budget Constraint = w(h) xa = wa(ha) (Budget Constraint of…
Q: Alice (A) and Bob (B) have an endowment of goods 1 and 2, with Alice's endowment being (w, wª) = (1,…
A: Walrasian equilibrium: It is theory that explains the macroeconomy functions as a whole. It do not…
Q: According to the Koszegi-Rabin mo del, people's reference points are determined by their recent…
A: The Endowment result refers to the finding that buyers assign a lot of worth to object just because…
Q: 9.9 PROBLEMS 1. In an exchange economy between A and B, and some representative indifference curves…
A: Individual A : Utility function : (xA)2 yA Endowments : (50 , 500 ) Budget Constraint : Px*xA +…
Q: an independent farmer, CO D F FF: Angela and Bruno combined 16 24 Angela's hours of free time ct TWO…
A: The correct answer is B. The final outcome could be point H, which is pareto improvement. D. The…
Q: If the total endowments for two goods are 20 and 80, the perimeter of the Edgeworth box will be: 60…
A: An endowment can also refer to the total of a non-profit institution's investable assets which is…
Q: Market research revealed that the customers can be separated into 5 groups according to their…
A: The utility function shows the technical relationship between the utility gained and the quantity…
Q: 6. (a) Draw upon Sen's analysis to demonstrate that attainment of Pareto optimality is not possible…
A: Utility Function Utility Function is the study of the welfare and satisfaction of consumers in an…
Q: The Condorcet paradox illustrates Arrow’simpossibility theorem by showing that pairwisemajority…
A: Arrow’s impossibility theorem explain the social choice paradox people of voting system. This…
Q: If A has TIOLI power in an exchange, which of the following are true? a. Person A will capture most…
A: Making time-restricted offers is a typical retail valuing technique. Monetary hypothesis infers that…
Q: Now,suppose N=3 with a market clearing interest rate. The first two agents are the same as earlier.…
A: At the point when the government is running at shortage budget than the public investment funds…
Q: 5. Consider an Edgeworth box economy where preferences are given by u'lat,x) = x}x and uai,3) = x,…
A: We’ll answer the first question since the exact one wasn’t specified. Please submit a new question…
Q: Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 identical agents, each of whom has the following utility…
A: “Since you have asked multiple questions, we will solve the first question for you. If you want any…
Q: Suppose there are two individuals and two goods. The initial endowments are wi = (100, 0) and we =…
A: W1= 100, 0 W2 = 100,100 U1 = x + y U2 = y Given the utility functions above, we can infer that for…
Q: Consider the following pure exchange, Edgeworth box economy. There are two consumers, Adam and Mark,…
A: (a) pareto optimal allocations are all points where one consumer can not be better off without…
Q: onsider an Edgeworth box economy where preferences are given by u'lx},x3) = x} + Inx and uaf,x3) =…
A: In economics, an Edgeworth box here and there alluded to as an Edgeworth-Bowley box is a graphical…
Q: 2. General Equilibrium. consumers, each with the same Cobb-Douglas preferences except with differ-…
A: There are two consumers : i = 1 ,2 Two goods : j = 1,2 Utility function for consumer 1 : u1(x11 ,…
Q: In an exchange economy, there are two agents, A and B, and there are 90 total units of x and 22…
A: Introduction: An exchange is a commercial center where protections, wares, subsidiaries, and other…
Q: 2. General Equilibrium. consumers, each with the same Cobb-Douglas preferences except with differ-…
A: There are two consumers : i = 1 ,2 Two goods : j = 1,2 Utility function for consumer 1 : u1(x11 ,…
Q: 2. General Equilibrium. consumers, each with the same Cobb-Douglas preferences except with differ-…
A: Given information two consumer's utility function Consumer 1 and consumer 2 Utility function for…
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 2 steps
- A husband and wife would produce incomes Yh and Yw in their fallback situations. The utility each derives in any circumstance is just equal to his or her consumption expenditure in that circumstance. In their fallback situations, their consumption expenditure levels are just equal to their incomes. Thus their fallback levels of utility are Yh and Yw. If they cooperate, they produce Z>Yh + Yw. They engage in Nash cooperative bargaining to determine how to allocate Z across the consumption of the husband, Ch, and consumption of the wife, Cw, subject to the budget constraint that Ch + Cw = Z. Under any bargained allocation, the two would derive utilities of Ch and Cw. a) The surplus associated with cooperation is S = Z − Yh − Yw. Show that each spouse consumes his or her fallback income plus half the surplus in the Nash cooperative bargaining solution. Please do fast ASAP fast please.A husband and wife would produce incomes Yh and Yw in their fallback situations. The utility each derives in any circumstance is just equal to his or her consumption expenditure in that circumstance. In their fallback situations, their consumption expenditure levels are just equal to their incomes. Thus their fallback levels of utility are Yh and Yw. If they cooperate, they produce Z>Yh + Yw. They engage in Nash cooperative bargaining to determine how to allocate Z across the consumption of the husband, Ch, and consumption of the wife, Cw, subject to the budget constraint that Ch + Cw = Z. Under any bargained allocation, the two would derive utilities of Ch and Cw. What do Ch and Cw equal if Yh = Yw (but this quantity is not equal to zero)? Please do fast ASAP fastConstructing an equilibrium Households live two periods and have prefernces U(c1)+βU(c2) where 0<β<1 and U is the utility function and satisfies our usual assumptions. There are N households in the economy. N1 of these have endowments y1 in the first period and no endowment in the second-these agents are called "Type 1". The remaining N2 have no endowment in the firs period and y2 in the second period- these agents are called "Type 2". Hencethe resources of the economy are N1y1 in the first period and N2y2 in the second, where N=N1+N2 Households have access to a credit market where the can borrow (s<0) or save s<0. The type 1 agent faces budget constraints y1=c11+s1 rs1=c21 where the consumption for the type i agent in period j is denoted cji. The type 2 agent faces budget constraints 0=c12+s2 y2+rs2=c22 The resource constraints are N1y1=N1c11+N2c12 N2y2=N11c21+N2c22 a) state the maximization problem solved by each type of agent and derive the fist order and second order…
- Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 identical agents, each of whom has the following utility function, u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2. The aggregate endowments of the 2 goods are given by (1; 2). Suppose there is a social planner who cares about agents equally.(a) Set up the plannerís problem.(b) Calculate the first-best outcome 2. Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 identical agents, each of whom has thefollowing utility function, 11(31, 3:2) = In 3:; + 2111332. The aggregate endowments ofthe 2 goods are given by (1, 2). Suppose there is a. social planner who cares aboutagents equally. (a) Set up the planner’s problem.(b) Calculate the first-best outcome (11.6., the social planner’s solution).Households live two periods and have prefernces U(c1)+βU(c2) where 0<β<1 and U is the utility function and satisfies our usual assumptions. There are N households in the economy. N1 of these have endowments y1 in the first period and no endowment in the second-these agents are called "Type 1". The remaining N2 have no endowment in the firs period and y2 in the second period- these agents are called "Type 2". Hencethe resources of the economy are N1y1 in the first period and N2y2 in the second, where N=N1+N2 Households have access to a credit market where the can borrow (s<0) or save s<0. The type 1 agent faces budget constraints y1=c11+s1 rs1=c21 where the consumption for the type i agent in period j is denoted cji. The type 2 agent faces budget constraints 0=c12+s2 y2+rs2=c22 The resource constraints are N1y1=N1c11+N2c12 N2y2=N11c21+N2c22 a) state the maximization problem solved by each type of agent and derive the fist order and second order conditions. Derive the…please only do: if you can teach explain each partc: what does it mean? can you show graphs: show WARP : If the consumer’s wealth is high enough that both bundles can buy with both prices then WARP violates If the consumer may not be spending all of her wealth, are her choices consistent withthe Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (or is it impossible to determine)?: If the consumer’s wealth is high enough that both bundles are aordable atboth prices then WARP violates. why? Therefore, it is notpossible to know
- Student question Time Left :00:09:43Suppose there are two consumers, A and B. The utility functions of each consumer are given by: UA(X,Y) = 2X + Y UB(X,Y) = Min(X,Y) The initial endowments are: A: X = 5; Y = 3 B: X = 2; Y = 2 a. Illustrate the initial endowments in an Edgeworth Box. Be sure to label the Edgeworth Box carefully and accurately, and make sure the dimensions of the box are correct. Also, draw each consumer’s indifference curve that runs through the initial endowments. Is this initial endowment Pareto Efficient? b. Now suppose Consumer A gets all of both goods. Is this allocation Pareto Efficient? (You do not need to draw a new graph or illustrate this on the existing graph. Simply answer “yes” or “no.”) c. Now suppose Consumer B gets all of both goods. Is this allocation Pareto Efficient? (You do not need to draw a new graph or illustrate this on the existing graph. Simply answer “yes” or “no.”)Consider an economy with 2 goods and 30 agents. There are 10 agentseach with the utility function u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2 and endowments e = (3; 1).Also, the other 20 agents each have the utility function u (z1; z2) = 2 ln z1 + ln z2 andendowments e = (1; 2). Normalize p2 = 1. Calculate the Walrasian equilibrium pricep1*Bluth’s preferences for paper and houses can be expressed as Ub(p, h) = 2pb + hb, while Scott’s preferences can be expressed as Us(p, h) = ps + 2bs. Bluth begins with no paper and 10 houses, whereas Scott begins with 10 units of paper and no houses. 1. Is the starting endowment Pareto efficient? Justify your answer using an Edgeworth box? Determine whether each of the following price pairs is consistent with a competitive equilibrium. If yes, determine the resulting allocation of goods, sketching that equi- librium in your Edgeworth box. If not, explain why not (for what good is there a shortage, for what good is there a surplus?) pp =$3 and ph =$1 along with pp =$1 and ph =$1 Assume that the price of houses is $1. Given that price, determine the highest price pp that is consistent with a competitive equilibrium.
- Suppose that 2 roommates, Andy and Bob, are trying to pick an apartment in Chicago. Locations can be chosen from set of alternatives A={ x: x exists [0,1]}. Andy and Bob both want to minimize their daily commute but they work at different locations: Andy at xA=0.3, while Bob at xB=0.6. Specifically, their utility functions are: ui(x)= -(x-xi)2. Question: What is the set of all Pareto Efficient outcomes in A, assuming no money can be exchanged.Consider an economy with 2 goods and 2 agents. The Örst agent has the utilityfunction, u (x1; x2) = ln x1 + 2 ln x2, and the other one has u (y1; y2) = 2 ln y1 + ln y2.The aggregate endowments of the 2 goods are given by (50; 100). Suppose there is asocial planner who cares about agents equally.(a) Set up the plannerís problem b) Calculate the first-best outcome (i.e., the social plannerís solution).A possible explanation for the indecency might be the fact that the consumers are not all alive at the same time and therefore some mutually advantageous trades cannot occur. Consider an economy where consumer t receives an endowment of 1 unit of the single consumption good at time t and obtains utility only from consumption at times t and t + 1. All consumers meet at time 0 to trade. What is the equilibrium? Is exigency restored?