Consider an apple orchard owner deciding how to incentivize his fruit pickers. He pays per pound harvested but adjusts the compensation rate higher during poor harvest seasons. As a consequence a. The compensation rate should be fixed at all times b. The pickers might try to game the system by discouraging others from harvesting too much c. The pickers would claim good harvests in order to be paid higher piece rates even during poor harvest seasons d. None of the above

Consider an apple orchard owner deciding how to incentivize his fruit pickers. He pays per pound harvested but adjusts the compensation rate higher during poor harvest seasons. As a consequence a. The compensation rate should be fixed at all times b. The pickers might try to game the system by discouraging others from harvesting too much c. The pickers would claim good harvests in order to be paid higher piece rates even during poor harvest seasons d. None of the above

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.11P

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