Consider that Firm 1 and Firm 2 are involved in price competition. The demand for each firm is given as follows, where X¡ denotes the demand for firm i=1,2 and Pj denotes the price that firm i=1,2 chooses. X1=465-3P1+P2 X2=465-3P2+P1 For each firm, it costs 5 to produce a product. At the Nash equilibrium, the price of Firm 1 is Blank 1. Calculate the answer by read surrounding text. , and the price of Firm 2 is Blank 2. Please answer Blank 1 and Blank2.
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- Consider a "Betrand price competition model" between two profit maximizing widget producers say A and B. The marginal cost of producing a widget is 4 for each producer. Each widget producer has a capacity constraint to produce only 5 widgets. There are 8 identical individuals who demand 1 widget only, and individuals value each widget at 6. If the firms are maximizing profits, then which of the following statement is true: a) Firm A and Firm B will charge 4 b) Firm A and Firm B will charge 6 c) Firm A and Firm B will charge greater than or equal to 5 d) None of the options are correct. Explain clearly.Consider a market for crude oil production. There are two firms in the market. The marginal cost of firm 1 is 20, while that of firm 2 is 20. The marginal cost is assumed to be constant. The inverse demand for crude oil is P(Q)=200-Q, where Q is the total production in the market. These two firms are engaging in Cournot competition. Find the production quantity of firm 1 in Nash equilibrium. If necessary, round off two decimal places and answer up to one decimal place.Which statement best describes a Nash equilibrium applies to price competition? 1. Two firms cooperate and set the price that maximizes joint profits. 2. Each firm automatically moves to the purely competitive equilibrium because it knows the other firm will eventually move to that price away. 3 given the prices chosen by its competitors, no firm has an incentive to change their prices from the equilibrium level. 4. One dominant firm sets the price, and the other firms take that’s price as if it were given by the market. 5. None of the above.
- Consider two firms that produce the same good and competesetting quantities. The firms face a linear demand curve given by P(Q) =1 − Q, where the Q is the total quantity offered by the firms. The costfunction for each of the firms is c(qi) = cqi, where 0 < c < 1 and qiis the quantity offered by the firm i = 1, 2. Find the Nash equilibriumoutput choices of the firms, as well as the total output and the price, andcalculate the output and the welfare loss compared to the competitiveoutcome. How would the answer change if the firms compete settingprices? What can we conclude about the relationship between competitionand the number of firms?Consider two firms that produce the same good and compete setting quantities. The firms face a linear demand curve given by P (Q) = 1 − Q, where the Q is the total quantity offered by the firms. The cost function for each of the firms is c(qi) = cqi, where 0 < c < 1 and qi is the quantity offered by the firm i = 1,2. Find the Nash equilibrium output choices of the firms, as well as the total output and the price, and calculate the output and the welfare loss compared to the competitive outcome. How would the answer change if the firms compete setting prices? What can we conclude about the relationship between competition and the number of firms?Consider a market organized along a 1 mile stretch of road (from D=0 to D=1). Consumers along the stretch of road are uniformly distributed. There are two firms, with Firm 1 located at mile marker .5 and Firm 2 located at mile marker 1.0 and they compete on prices. Customers choose which store to shop at according to P + cD, where c=2 and D is the distance to the store. What is the Nash Equilibrium?
- Three firms compete in the style of Cournot. All firms have a constant returns to scale technology: There are no fixed cost and each firm's marginal cost is constant. The market demand is given by Q(P) = 9 - P. Firm 1's marginal cost is MC1 = 1, firm 2's marginal cost is MC2 = 2. Let MC3 be the marginal cost of Firm 3. Which of the below is a necessary condition so that q > 0 for all three firms in a Nash equilibrium? a. MC3 < 1 b. MC3 < 4 c. MC3 < 3 d. MC3 > 1 e. MC3 < 2(Cournot competition with different marginal costs) Our best estimate for total marketdemand in a given market is P 1000-2Q. Two firms (1 and 2) are competing in this market in quantities, choosing Q1 and Q2 simultaneously. Firm 1 has marginalcost equal to c1 = 100 and Firm 2 produces at marginal cost c2 = 200. (a) Write down the profits of both firms and and their best response functions. (b) Find the Cournot - Nash equilibrium in quantities, and calculate equilibrium profits for both firms. (c) Suppose that each firm has the option, at a previous stage, to invest in an R&D project that will reduce its marginal cost of production by 50% if successful. What is the value of this innovation to each firm? Given that R&D costs and successprobabilities are equal, which one has greater incentives to invest in R&D ? You can think in terms of per - period profits to set aside timing issues.Three electricity generating firms are competing in the market with the inverse demand given by P(Q) = 20 – Q. All firms have constant marginal costs. Firm 1’s marginal cost is MC = 5; it has a capacity constraint of K1 = 5 units. Firm 2’s marginal cost is MC = 8; it has a capacity constraint of K2 = 2.5 units. Firm 3’s marginal cost is MC = 10; it has a capacity constraint of K3 = 2.5 units. A. The three firms compete in the style of Cournot. Please compute the Nash equilibrium quantities. Also compute the price in the Nash equilibrium. B. Which of these firms would have produced a larger quantity if it had a larger capacity?
- Two firms produce the samecommodity, both with zero cost. The demand for this commodity is D(P) = 100−P.The two firms can each produce at most 50 units. They compete on price andrationing is efficient: if pi < pj then the demand that j faces is Dj(p) = D(pj) − qi,where qi is the quantity supplied by firm i. That is, the lower price firm gets to sellfirst. Is the price list p = (p1, p2) = (0, 0) a Nash equilibrium? Prove your assertion.Let ci be the constant marginal and average cost for firm i (so that firms may have different marginal costs). Suppose demand is given by P=1-Q. Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities assuming there are two firms in a Cournot market. Also compute market output, market price, firm profits, industry prof- its, consumer surplus, and total welfare. Represent the Nash equilibrium on a best-response function diagram. Show how a reduction in firm 1’s cost would change the equilibrium. Draw a representative isoprofit for firm 1.suppose there are two firms that compete in prices, say firms 1 and 2, but that the firms produce differentiated products. Suppose that the demand for firm 1 is q1(p1,p2)=10-2p1+p2 and the demand for firm 2 is q2(p2,p1)=10-2p2+p1. Also, assume that firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of c1 = 2 and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of c2 = 3. i. Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium in prices. ii. Now, suppose firms 1 and 2 merge and firm 1 will operate both firms and they will split the resulting profits equally. Will both firms agree to this merger or do they prefer the Bertrand outcome?