According to the Five Competitive Forces Model, the number of competitors in an industry affects a firm's ability to charge a price above average cost and earn an economic profit, but this is not the only determinant. Match each situation with the competitive force it exemplifies. а. Threat of new entrants d. Threat of substitutes b. Bargaining power of suppliers Bargaining power of customers Rivalry between existing competitors е. с. 4. All of the companies in the parcel delivery service are making substantial economic profits, so Amazon decides to start its own service that delivers goods not only sold through Amazon but by outside companies as well. 5. Because of the high profits earned by insulin-makers, pharmaceutical researchers are actively trying to develop new, different drugs that have the same results for diabetics.

According to the Five Competitive Forces Model, the number of competitors in an industry affects a firm's ability to charge a price above average cost and earn an economic profit, but this is not the only determinant. Match each situation with the competitive force it exemplifies. а. Threat of new entrants d. Threat of substitutes b. Bargaining power of suppliers Bargaining power of customers Rivalry between existing competitors е. с. 4. All of the companies in the parcel delivery service are making substantial economic profits, so Amazon decides to start its own service that delivers goods not only sold through Amazon but by outside companies as well. 5. Because of the high profits earned by insulin-makers, pharmaceutical researchers are actively trying to develop new, different drugs that have the same results for diabetics.

Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)

9th Edition

ISBN:9781305260948

Author:Irvin B. Tucker

Publisher:Irvin B. Tucker

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20SQ

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