Given the stage game above/below. Suppose that the players play (C,C) in period t = 1; 3; 5; ::: and plays (D,D) in period t = 2; 4; 6; ::. Compute the discounted payoff of each playe
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Given the stage game above/below. Suppose that the players play (C,C) in period t = 1; 3; 5; ::: and plays (D,D) in period t = 2; 4; 6; ::. Compute the discounted payoff of each player.
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