Consider two Cournot firms, Firm A and Firm B. Firm A has a marginal cost of 10 and Firm B has a marginal cost of 5. They face the market inverse demand function: P = 120 – Q How many units will Firm A produce?
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- Suppose there are in total 3 firms in the market. Firm 1 decides its output first, then Firm 2 and Firm 3 decide their outputs simultaneously. The inverse demand function is p = 20-3q, where q = q1+q2+q3, and each firm's cost function is ci(qi) = 5qi2. What is the quantity that Firm 1 produces? Round your answer to 2 decimal points.Suppose that the Bob Buttons Company (BBC) enters the market. BBC has the same cost function of c=3q+1. Let denote q1 the quantity sold by ABC and denote the q2 quantity sold by BBC. Now suppose that ABC and BBC reach a Cournot equilibrium. Q: What would be the net change in ABC’s profit as a result of BBC’s entry into the market?____ (type in a negative number if ABC’s profit decreases) (please see the attachement for partial of my work, not sure if it's correct, thank you!)Consider two gas stations in a remote village facing the simple linear market demand Q = 300 - 5P, but have different marginal costs of production, both constant, such that MCx = 20 and MCy = 10. Find: if gas station y decided to produce 175 units, (a) what would be the reaction of gas station x, and (b) how would y, in turn, react to that level of output of x?
- Only typed answer Two firms both produce leather boots. The inverse demand equation is given by P = 340 - 2Q, where P is the price of boots in USD/pair and Q is quantity of boots in million pair. The cost function is given by: C(Q) = 40Q. If the two firms are Stackelberg oligopolists), the output of the leader is equal to: 1) 60 2) 80 3) 75 4) 900Consider two identical firms (firm 1 and firm 2) that face a linear market demand curve. Each firmhas a marginal cost of zero and the two firms together face demand: P = 50 - 0.5Q, where Q = Q1 +Q2. Find the Cournot equilibrium quantity and market price for each firm.Consider a market with only two firms. The firms operate in a Stackelberg type market where Firm 1 is the follower & Firm 2 is the leader. The market inverse demand function is: P = 120 – 2Q, where Q = q1 + q2. Each firm has a similar cost structure with a marginal cost; MC = 12, though each have different fixed costs; FC1 = 50 & FC2 = 80. Answer the following questions: a. If both firms wish to compete, what is the optimal quantity for each firm (qi) and the market price? b. What are the profits for each firm from the strategy in part a? c. If both firms choose to collude and not directly compete, what is the new price, quantity, and profits for each firm?
- Two farmers produce milk for local town with local milk demand given by Q=100-1/3P (P denotes price measured in Rands, Q denotes the quantity measured in litres). Both farmers have the same cost function given by TC=150+2q (where q denotes output)a. What if farmer 1 is a leader and farmer 2 a follower, determine the price, quantity and profits made by these two farmersConsider the daily market for hot dogs in a small city. Suppose that this market is in long-run competitive equilibrium with many hot dog stands in the city, each one selling the same kind of hot dogs. Therefore, each vendor is a price taker and possesses no market power. The following graph shows the demand (D) and supply (S = MC) curves in the market for hot dogs. Place the black point (plus symbol) on the graph to indicate the market price and quantity that will result from competition. Assume that one of the hot dog vendors successfully lobbies the city council to obtain the exclusive right to sell hot dogs within the city limits. This firm buys up all the rest of the hot dog vendors in the city and operates as a monopoly. Assume that this change doesn't affect demand and that the new monopoly's marginal cost curve corresponds exactly to the supply curve on the previous graph. Under this assumption, the following graph shows the demand (D), marginal revenue (MR), and…Consider the market for bicycles in the fictional province of Westvale. The market demand function for bicycles is given by P=300-2Q. The marginal cost curve for firms in this market is given by P=40+Q. Prices are measured in dollars. a) Under a competitive market equilibrium, what is the price of a bicycle? b) How many bicycles are produced under a competitive market equilibrium? c) Calculate consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus under the competitive market equilibrium Suppose that the firms that were once competing in this market merge into one single firm, forming a monopoly. This monopoly has a marginal revenue function of P=300-4Q. d) What price does this monopolist charge? e) How many bicycles does the monopolist produce? f) Calculate consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus under the monopolistic market outcome g) How much deadweight loss resulted from the creation of the monopolist?
- There are two sellers who compete by choosing quantity (Cournot). The inverse demand is P = 120 − Q. Each firm’s cost is 30Q. There are no fixed costs. In this market, firms decide how much to produce, and then the price is determined by the market (think of fishing boats, for example). Suppose that Firm 2 produces 30. Then the inverse demand facing Firm 1 is P = 120 − 30 − Q1 = 90 − Q1. This implies that Firm 1’s marginal revenue is 90 −2Q1. How much will Firm 1 produce to maximize its profits? Suppose that Firm 1 produces 30. Then the inverse demand facing Firm 2 is P = 120 − 30 − Q2 = 90 − Q2. This implies that Firm 2’s marginal revenue is 90 −2Q2. How much will Firm 2 produce to maximize its profits? If both firms produce 30, what are both firms’ profits? Suppose the buyers in this market proposed that the firms compete in a price game rather than a quantity game. For example, they might suggest that sellers compete in a price auction before production takes place. The winner…. The market for widgets consists of two firms that produce identical products. Competition in the market is such that each of the firms independently produces a quantity of output, and these quantities are then sold in the market at a price that is determined by the total amount produced by the two firms. Firm 2 is known to have a cost advantage over firm 1. A recent study found that the (inverse) market demand curve faced by the two firms is P = 280 – 2(Q1 + Q2), and costs are C1(Q1) = 3Q1 and C2(Q2) = 2Q2. a. Determine the marginal revenue for each firm. b. Determine the reaction function for each firm.Two firms (called firm 1 and firm 2) are the only sellers of a good for which the demand equation is Here, q is the total quantity of the good demanded and p is the price of the good measured in dollars. Neither firm has any fixed costs, and each firm’s marginal cost of producing a unit of goods is $2. Imagine that each firm produces some quantity of goods, and that these goods are sold to consumers at the highest price at which all of the goods can be sold. A Cournot equilibrium in this environment is a pair of outputs (q1, q2) such that, when firm 1 produces q1 units of goods and firm 2 produces q2 units of goods, neither firm can raise its profits by unilaterally changing its output. Find the Cournot equilibrium. Determine whether the price at which the goods are sold exceeds marginal cost.