D Consi der Hhe fallowing Cournet medel. » The inverse femand function is given bj p= 30-@ where Q = {, + { Firm 1' margimal cost is $6(cis6). Fivm 2 uses a nom s. that its margjinal cost is $3 (6-3). fixed cort. There is no a The fwo fims chorce thir quarti tias simaltaneculy and Compete only Jame). Amswer the falloning puarfinns. Derive Firm 1 nd Firm 2% veaitin fuitions. respertivaly S solve Hhe Hach equilibium ({", q") What is He equilibrinm price and what is Hhe ponfit level for eash firm. So its a one- shot simulfanecus once O Suppot there is a market for the teihuo lagy uped by Finm 2. klhat is the highert price that Firm 1 is willing to pag for this now ferhmlojj Now lete change the setup faom Comet Gmpititin to Bertrand Campetitim, while maintaining all other ayAuamp tins- Wlhat is He equilibium price? Suppon the two finms engage in Bartrand (ompetiton Whiat is the hijhurt price that Frm 1 ů willng to pay for He new

Exploring Economics
8th Edition
ISBN:9781544336329
Author:Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:Robert L. Sexton
Chapter11: The Firm: Production And Costs
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Kindly solve from part D - F. Thanks a lot.

Consi der Hhe fallowing
» The inverse femand function is givan by p= 30-@
Cournet medel.
where Q = E,+
* Firm 13 marginal cost is $6lei=6). Fivm 2 uses a nem
techaulagy
There is no
that it's marginal cost is $3 (6=3).
fixed cort
So
The fwo fims chooce thair
and Compete only
Jame).
Answer the follming puestions.
O Derive Firm 1 amd Firm 2% vation furtions reupertivaly.
o Solve Hhe Harh equilibrium ( ", q")
O What is He equilibrinm
level for eah firm.
quenti tias simultaneculy
(So it's a
one- shot simultaneaus
once
price and what is Hhe profit
Suppore there is
Iim 2. Wlhat is the highert price that Firm I is
willing to paj for this new
o Mow let's chauge the setup from Coumet campetition
to Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all efther
aJAump tins. What is He equilibium price?
O Suppon the fwe finms engage in Betrand (ompetition
What is the hijhut price that Fim 1 o milling
for He new feihnly?
* market for the teihue lagy uped by
to
Transcribed Image Text:Consi der Hhe fallowing » The inverse femand function is givan by p= 30-@ Cournet medel. where Q = E,+ * Firm 13 marginal cost is $6lei=6). Fivm 2 uses a nem techaulagy There is no that it's marginal cost is $3 (6=3). fixed cort So The fwo fims chooce thair and Compete only Jame). Answer the follming puestions. O Derive Firm 1 amd Firm 2% vation furtions reupertivaly. o Solve Hhe Harh equilibrium ( ", q") O What is He equilibrinm level for eah firm. quenti tias simultaneculy (So it's a one- shot simultaneaus once price and what is Hhe profit Suppore there is Iim 2. Wlhat is the highert price that Firm I is willing to paj for this new o Mow let's chauge the setup from Coumet campetition to Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all efther aJAump tins. What is He equilibium price? O Suppon the fwe finms engage in Betrand (ompetition What is the hijhut price that Fim 1 o milling for He new feihnly? * market for the teihue lagy uped by to
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