Daniel Mathews a footballer who is based in Sweden received a fine of $2 500 and a two-match suspension for use of performance-enhancing drugs. Daniel receives a match fee of $5 000 per match from the Sweden Footballers Board, plus additional appearance money of $10 000 per match from Adidas. He also pays $500 per match for comprehensive insurance against injury. In opportunity cost terms, the cost of this incident for Daniel Mathews is: a) $17 500 b) $14 000 c) $31 500 d) $14 000.

Daniel Mathews a footballer who is based in Sweden received a fine of $2 500 and a two-match suspension for use of performance-enhancing drugs. Daniel receives a match fee of $5 000 per match from the Sweden Footballers Board, plus additional appearance money of $10 000 per match from Adidas. He also pays $500 per match for comprehensive insurance against injury. In opportunity cost terms, the cost of this incident for Daniel Mathews is: a) $17 500 b) $14 000 c) $31 500 d) $14 000.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.7P

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