Economics A group of 20,000 households in one neighborhood was covered in fire insurance that estimates a 2% probability of loss. Assuming that in the same neighborhood, the actual number of houses gutted by fire within one coverage cycle is 350 to 450. Requirements; a. Compute for the expected value of the loss.

Economics A group of 20,000 households in one neighborhood was covered in fire insurance that estimates a 2% probability of loss. Assuming that in the same neighborhood, the actual number of houses gutted by fire within one coverage cycle is 350 to 450. Requirements; a. Compute for the expected value of the loss.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7MC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Uncertainty The Utility function is U = W1/3Flood occurs with Probabilities=1/25. The Value of a house is $450,000 if no flood. Aftera flood, the value is $50,000. Cost of insurance is 10 cents per dollar.a. Calculate EU b. Calculate EV c. Calculate CE d. Calculate RP e. Calculate the variance and standard deviation f. How much insurance should you buy? Assume your are paying premium in all events.g. What is the expected profit of the insurance company? h. Calculate the coefficient of absolute and relative risk aversion
The Utility fct is U = W2/3 + 1000Flood occurs with Probabilities=1/20. The Value of house ✩540,000 if no flood. After aflood, the value is ✩40,000. Cost of insurance is 20 cents per dollar.a. Calculate EUb. Calculate EVc. Calculate CEd. Calculate RPe. Calculate the variance and standard deviationf. How much insurance should you buy? Assume your are paying premium in all event.g. What is the expected profit of the insurance company?h. Calculate the coefficient of absolute risk aversioni. Calculate the coefficient of relative risk aversion
A plaintiff believes that there is a 30% chance that he will winIf he wins, he will gain $50,000. It costs him $5000 in non‐recoverable litigation costs to take the case to court. If the plaintiff is risk‐neutral, which of the following is true? A) The plaintiff will take the case to court with an expected net‐gain of $10,000 B) The plaintiff will take the case to court with an expected net‐gain of $15,000 C) The plaintiff will not take the case to court because he is afraid of losing. D) None of the above
Q1) An expected utility maximiser owns a car worth £60000£60000 and has a bank account with £20000£20000. The money in the bank is safe, but there is a 50%50% probability that the car will be stolen. The utility of wealth for the agent is u(y)=ln(y)u(y)=ln⁡(y) and they have no other assets. Q2) Consider the setup from Question 1. A risk-neutral insurance company is willing to insure the car at the premium of π=£2/3π=£2/3 for every one pound of coverage. Q3) Consider the setup from Questions 1 and 2. How much profits, in expectation, does the insurance company earn on insuring the individual?
PROBLEM (4) A homeowner with expected utility preferences with u(x)= sqare root x owns a house worth $490k. There is a probability p that she will experience a house fire, in which case the damages will cost $240k. A risk-neutral insurance company asks for an insurance premium of $10k in return for covering the damages fully in case of a fire. (a) What should p be so that the homeowner is willing to insure her house? (b) What should p be so that the insurance company is willing to offer insurance?
Joes initial income is y 10,000. Joe experiences illness with a probability of 20%. Jo's total medical costs associated with the illness are $1000. Joe's expected income without insurance is
Q1) An expected utility maximiser owns a car worth £60000£60000 and has a bank account with £20000£20000. The money in the bank is safe, but there is a 50%50% probability that the car will be stolen. The utility of wealth for the agent is u(y)=ln(y)u(y)=ln⁡(y) and they have no other assets.
1. A customer has utility function u(x) = log(x + 1000). The customer’scurrent wealth is $28,000. The customer’s car has a value of $14,700. Theprobability of the car being stolen is 0.016. How much would the customerbe willing to pay for insurance against the car being stolen?
A risk-averse individual experiences an adverse event with probability of 2% (0.02) that costs $1000. How much insurance coverage will the individual purchase if premiums are actuarily fair? a-some amount more than $1000 b-$1000 c-$0 d-some amount greater than $0, but less than $1000
Tom wants to avoid any accidents on the work floor of his factory. If an accident does occur, itwould cost him $500,000 in damages. Installing safety equipment would decrease the probabilityof an accident occurring from 20% to 10%. However, the equipment costs $20,000 to install.10. What is his expected loss after installing the safety equipmenta. $20,000b. $50,000c. $100,000d. $125,000
Many decision problems have the following simplestructure. A decision maker has two possible decisions, 1 and 2. If decision 1 is made, a sure cost of c isincurred. If decision 2 is made, there are two possibleoutcomes, with costs c1 and c2 and probabilities p and1 2 p. We assume that c1 , c , c2. The idea is thatdecision 1, the riskless decision, has a moderate cost,whereas decision 2, the risky decision, has a low costc1 or a high cost c2.a. Calculate the expected cost from the riskydecision.b. List as many scenarios as you can think of thathave this structure. (Here’s an example to get youstarted. Think of insurance, where you pay a surepremium to avoid a large possible loss.) For eachof these scenarios, indicate whether you wouldbase your decision on EMV or on expected utility
Suppose that an individual is just willing to accept a gamble to win or lose $1000 if the probability ofwinning is 0.6. Suppose that the utility gained if the individual wins is 100 utils. What is expected gains/loss.