2 thority would be likely to block this merger. [max: 50 words]2. There are n > 2 profit-maximising firms producing a homogeneous good, competing inquantity, and facing the inverse demand function P(Q) = 10 – Q, where Q = "-1 9iis the total quantity produced in the market. Each firm i faces the same linear costfunction: C(q;) = 2qi.(a) Find the total quantity produced and the equilibrium price.(d) For what values of n are consumers strictly worse off under the cartel than undercompetition?(e) Comparing the competitive price (found in (a)), the cartel price (found in (c)),and the price that the cartel would set if there were no competition authority, howeffective is the competition authority at keeping the price low?please do only part D and E in 10 minutes willupvote

l quantity produced in the market. Each firm i faces the same lin C(q) = 2qi- %3D the total quantity produced and the equilibrium price. at values of n are consumers strictly worse off under the cartel than under ition? ring the competitive price (found in (a)), the cartel price (found in (c)) e price that the cartel would set if there were no competition authority, how e is the competition authority at keeping the price low? o only part D and E in 10 minutes

l quantity produced in the market. Each firm i faces the same lin C(q) = 2qi- %3D the total quantity produced and the equilibrium price. at values of n are consumers strictly worse off under the cartel than under ition? ring the competitive price (found in (a)), the cartel price (found in (c)) e price that the cartel would set if there were no competition authority, how e is the competition authority at keeping the price low? o only part D and E in 10 minutes

Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613040

Author:Tucker

Publisher:Tucker

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17SQ

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Suppose three firms compete in a homogeneous-product Cournot industry. The market elasticity of demand for the product is −2, and each firm’s marginal cost of production is $50. What is the profit-maximizing equilibrium price?
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