Match the definition to each term listed below,NumberDefinitionA table that shows the payoffs each firm earns from every combination of firm strategiesAn agreement among firms to charge the same price or otherwine not to competeAn option that is better than any alternative option regardless of what the other firm doesAn outcome of a strategic game from which neither rival wants to deviateA game outcome in which players seek to increase their mutual payoffA practice where one firm initiates a price change and the other firms follow the leaderA game in which the firms choose their strategies at the same timeOne firm'a gain must equal the other firm's lossA game in which the sum of the two firms outcomes in positiveFirms select their optimal strategies in a single time period without regard to possibleinteract.ions in subsequent time periodsA game that occurs more than once2.6.1011Instructions: Enter a numeric response corresponding to the number of the definition listed above.a. Payoff matrix:b. A repeated game:c. Nash equilibrlum:d. Zero-sum game:e. Dominant strategy:

a. Payoff Matrix- It is a matrix consisting of payoffs that each firm gets by playing different…

Match the definition to each term listed below. Number Definition A table that shows the payoffs each firm earns from every combination of firm atrategies An agreement among firms to charge the same price or otherwine not to compete An option that is better than any alternative option regardless of what the other firm does An outcome of a strategic game from vhich neither rival vants to deviate A game outcome in vhich players seek to increase their mutual payoff A practice where one firm initiates a price change and the other firms follow the leader A game in vhich the firms choose their strategies at the same time One firm's gain must egual the other firm's loss A game in vhich the sum of the two tirms outcomes is positive Pirms select their optimal strategies in a single time period without regard to possible interactions in subsequent time periods A game that occurs more than once 2 6. 10 11 Instructions: Enter a numeric response corresponding to the number of the definition listed above. a Payoff matrix b. A repeated game: c. Nash equilibrium: d. Zero-sum game: e. Dominant strategy:

Match the definition to each term listed below. Number Definition A table that shows the payoffs each firm earns from every combination of firm atrategies An agreement among firms to charge the same price or otherwine not to compete An option that is better than any alternative option regardless of what the other firm does An outcome of a strategic game from vhich neither rival vants to deviate A game outcome in vhich players seek to increase their mutual payoff A practice where one firm initiates a price change and the other firms follow the leader A game in vhich the firms choose their strategies at the same time One firm's gain must egual the other firm's loss A game in vhich the sum of the two tirms outcomes is positive Pirms select their optimal strategies in a single time period without regard to possible interactions in subsequent time periods A game that occurs more than once 2 6. 10 11 Instructions: Enter a numeric response corresponding to the number of the definition listed above. a Payoff matrix b. A repeated game: c. Nash equilibrium: d. Zero-sum game: e. Dominant strategy:

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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