MCQ 49 Consider a game in which two firms (A and B) are considering whether to increase or reduce output. In this game, firm A has a dominant strategy A I do not want to answer this question. В firm B does not have a dominant strategy C the pay-off to firm A from that strategy is greater than the pay-off from any other strategy, regardless of what firm B does D firm A can produce units of output at a lower unit cost than firm B E an increase in output generates a positive pay-off for firm A when firm B reduces output F firm B is uncertain about what firm A will do
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- Exercise 6.1Suppose that two airlines decide to collude. Analyse the game between these two companies. Suppose that each of them can charge for tickets a high price or a low price. If one of them charges 100 euros, it gets few profits if the other also charges 100 euros and high profits if the other charges 200 euros. On the other hand, if the company charges 200 euros, it obtains very little profit if the other charges 100 euros and an average profit if the other also charges 200 euros. a) Represent the matrix of results of this game. b) What is the Nash equilibrium in this game? Explain your answer. c) Is there an outcome that would be better than the Nash equilibrium for the two airlines? How could it be achieved? Who would lose out if it were reached?12. Consider a game where each player picks a number from 0 to 60. The guess that is closest to half ofthe average of the chosen numbers wins a prize. If several peopleare equally close, then they share theprize. The game theory implies that (A) all players have dominant strategies to choose 0 (B) all players have dominant strategies to choose 30 (C) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick 0 (D) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick positive numbers 13. Behavioral data in such games suggests that (A) most subjects choose 0; (B) most subjects choose 30; (C) common answers include 30, 15, 7.5, and 0; (D) most subjects use randomization. Can you help me answer number 13 please?H3. Cooperation in a Finite Game We have seen that if we play the Prisoners' dilemma with finite repetition, there will be no cooperation in the subgame-perfect equilibrium. There are other games, however, when cooperation can be enforced for at least some time in a finite repetition as well. Give an example with explanation. (Hint: consider games with more than one Nash equilibria.)
- Consider the strategic voting game discussed at the endof this chapter, where we saw that the strategy profile (Bustamante, Schwarzenegger,Schwarzenegger) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Show that (Bustamante, Schwarzeneg-ger, Schwarzenegger) is, in fact , the only rationalizable strategy profile. Do this by firstconsidering the dominated strategies of player L. (Basically, the question is asking youto find the outcome of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies)Prove that in the variation on the centipede game given in figure 14.5(b) the unique sequential equilibrium described is, in fact, the unique Nash equilibrium. (Hint: Take some presumed Nash equilibrium and suppose information set 2n+ 1 [for player 2] is the first unreached information set. Derive an immediate contradiction. Then suppose that node (2n) t is the first unreached information set and derive a contradiction that is one degree removed from immediate.)Consider the extensive form game portrayed below. The top number at aterminal node is player 1’s payoff, the middle number is player 2’s payoff,and the bottom number is player 3’s payoff.a. Derive the strategy set for each player. (Note: If you do not want to listall of the strategies, you can provide a general description of a player’sstrategy, give an example, and state how many strategies are in thestrategy set.)b. Derive all subgame perfect Nash equilibria. c. Derive a Nash equilibrium that is not a SPNE, and explain why it isnot a SPNE.
- Consider the following game: Player 2 In Out Player 1 In -2,-2 2, 0 Out 0, 2 0, 0 (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game, or what are the Nash equilibriaof this game? (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)? Which? (c) Suppose Player 1 could move before Player 2 and Player 2 could observe Player 1’s move. What do you think would happen?Suppose we’ve modelled a firm’s entry decision with a one-shot, simultaneous move game, determined payoffs and found the Nash equilibrium. Suppose with the payoffs we came up with, both firms have a clear dominant strategy such that there is a Nash equilibrium in which both firms play their dominant strategy. However, when we observe the actual actions of the firms, we see that they don’t choose the strategy wepredicted and the outcome of the game doesn’t match the Nash equilibrium. What are 4 reasons this might be? (Hint: The firms are rational.)answer the ff: Suppose that each company cancharge either a high price for tickets or a low price. Ifone company charges $300, it earns low profit if theother company also charges $300 and high profit ifthe other company charges $600. On the other hand,if the company charges $600, it earns very low profit ifthe other company charges $300 and medium profitif the other company also charges $600.a. Draw the decision box for this game.b. What is the Nash equilibrium in this game?Explain.c. Is there an outcome that would be better than theNash equilibrium for both airlines? How could itbe achieved? Who would lose if it were achieved?
- on 8.1 Consider the following game: Player 1 A C D 7,6 5,8 0,0 Player 2 E 5,8 7,6 1, 1 F 0,0 1,1 4,4 a. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any). b. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes over just the first two actions. c. Compute players' expected payoffs in the equilibria found in parts (a) and (b). d. Draw the extensive form for this game.John enjoys playing two-player zero-sum games. The matrix below shows the losses to John in a particular two-player zero-sum game. His strategies are denoted by I, II, and III, whereas the strategies for his opponent are denoted by A, B, and C. I II III A 3 2 4 B 0 1 1 C 1 3 0 (a) Explain which of John’s strategies is dominated.The opponent now has the option of a fourth strategy, D, which results in none ofJohn’s strategies being dominated.(b) Suggest possible values for the strategy D.6 Two people will select a policy that affects both of them by applying a "veto" in a sequential and alternate manner, that is: person 1 begins to veto a policy and then person 2 exercises his "veto" with the remaining policies; the process repeats until only one policy remains. Assume that there are 3 policies: X,Y,Z, and that person 1 prefers X to Y to Z and person 2 prefers Z to Y to X. a. Represents the game extensively b. Give the number of subgames C. Indicate the total strategies of the players d. find all subgame perfect nash equilibria e. Find all Nash Equilibriums.