Output is homogenous and the demand curve isP = 448 - Q. There are two firms with identical%3Dcosts given by C = q2 i where qi is theproduction of firm i.The marginal cost of firm i is Mci(qi) = 2qi .(a) Find the Cournot equilibrium firm outputs. (b)

As it is given to us that P=448-Q C=Qi^2 MC=2Qi

Output is homogenous and the demand curve P = 448 - Q. There are two firms with identica %3D costs given by C = q2 i where qi is the %3D production of firm i. The marginal cost of firm i is MCi(qi) = 2qi . (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium firm outputs.

Output is homogenous and the demand curve P = 448 - Q. There are two firms with identica %3D costs given by C = q2 i where qi is the %3D production of firm i. The marginal cost of firm i is MCi(qi) = 2qi . (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium firm outputs.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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