Penalty point in soccer. Column Defend left Defend right Kick left 50, -50 80, 80 Row Kick right 90, -90 20, -20 Note that the payofts in each entry sum to zero, indicating that the players have diametrically opposed goals. Row wants to maximize his expec payoff, and column wants to maximize her expected payoff-which means she wants to minimize row's payoff. Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash Equilibria? Check all that apply. Kick Left, Defend Left Kick Left, Defend Right Kick Right, Defend Left Kick Right. Defend Right There is no Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
Penalty point in soccer. Column Defend left Defend right Kick left 50, -50 80, 80 Row Kick right 90, -90 20, -20 Note that the payofts in each entry sum to zero, indicating that the players have diametrically opposed goals. Row wants to maximize his expec payoff, and column wants to maximize her expected payoff-which means she wants to minimize row's payoff. Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash Equilibria? Check all that apply. Kick Left, Defend Left Kick Left, Defend Right Kick Right, Defend Left Kick Right. Defend Right There is no Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
Principles of Microeconomics
7th Edition
ISBN:9781305156050
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw
Chapter17: Oligopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 5PA
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Transcribed Image Text:Penalty point in soccer.
Column
Defend left Defend right
Kick left
50, -50
80, 80
Row
Kick right
90, -90
20, -20
Note that the payoffs in each entry sum to zero, indicating that the players have diametrically opposed goals. Row wants to maximize his expec
payoff, and column wants to maximize her expected payoff-which means she wants to minimize row's payoff.
Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash Equilibria? Check all that apply.
Kick Left, Defend Left
Kick Left, Defend Right
Kick Right, Defend Left
Kick Right. Defend Right
There is no Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
OODOO
Transcribed Image Text:Player 1
Top
Bottom
Player 2
Player 2
Left
Right
Left
Right
(4, 8)
(4, 8)
(0, 0)
(6, 2)
Use backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibrium. If the players follow this equilibrium, we would obsers
Player 1 choosing Bottom, Player 2 choosing Right
Player 1 choosing Top,. Player 2 choosing Left
Player 1 choosing Top, Player 2 choosing Right
Player 1 choosing Bottom, Player 2 choosing Left
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