QUESTION 21 (Table: GoGo Gas and Fanny's Fantastic Fuel) Use Table: GoGo Gas and Fanny's Fantastic Fuel. The table shows a payoff matrix for GoGo Gas and Fanny's Fantastic Fuel in a small town. Each firm can set either a high price or a low price, and customers view both gas stations as nearly perfect substitutes. Profits in each cell of the payoff matrix are given as (GoGo's profit, Fanny's profit). If each fim sets the price independently, the Nash equilibrium outcome will be: Table: GoGo Gas and Fanny's Fantastic Fuel Fanny's Fantastic Fuel High Price High Price S100, $100 $25, $150 $150, $25 Low Price GoGo Gas Low Price $50, $50 Oa $100, $100. b. $150, $25. c. $25, $150. d. $50, $50

QUESTION 21 (Table: GoGo Gas and Fanny's Fantastic Fuel) Use Table: GoGo Gas and Fanny's Fantastic Fuel. The table shows a payoff matrix for GoGo Gas and Fanny's Fantastic Fuel in a small town. Each firm can set either a high price or a low price, and customers view both gas stations as nearly perfect substitutes. Profits in each cell of the payoff matrix are given as (GoGo's profit, Fanny's profit). If each fim sets the price independently, the Nash equilibrium outcome will be: Table: GoGo Gas and Fanny's Fantastic Fuel Fanny's Fantastic Fuel High Price High Price S100, $100 $25, $150 $150, $25 Low Price GoGo Gas Low Price $50, $50 Oa $100, $100. b. $150, $25. c. $25, $150. d. $50, $50

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter23: Managing Vertical Relationships

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1MC

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Explain why an economy in which airlines chargedifferent passegers with different prices for the sameflight will not have exchange efficiency. Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion
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JetBlue and Delta are the only two major airlines with regularly scheduled service between New York and Nantucket. There are 900 potential passengers every week, each of whom is willing to pay up to $400 for a ticket. Since the two airlines provide an essentially identical (bad) service, customers simply prefer to buy from the cheaper one. (If they charge the same price, then they will split the market equally.) Each airline can transport at most 1200 passengers each week. You can safely assume that each airline spends literal peanuts (i.e., zero) serving passengers; however, each passenger displaces air cargo that is worth $160 in profits to the carriers. Suppose that each airline takes a short-run perspective and only wants to maximize each week's profits, and that neither one would consider shutting down the route in the foreseeable future. (a) What is the appropriate economic model to study price competition in this market? (b) If you use Nash equilibrium to make a prediction, what…
JetBlue and Delta are the only two major airlines with regularly scheduled service between New York and Nantucket. There are 900 potential passengers every week, each of whom is willing to pay up to $400 for a ticket. Since the two airlines provide an essentially identical (bad) service, customers simply prefer to buy from the cheaper one. (If they charge the same price, then they will split the market equally.) Each airline can transport at most 1200 passengers each week. You can safely assume that each airline spends literal peanuts (i.e., zero) serving passengers; however, each passenger displaces air cargo that is worth $160 in profits to the carriers. Suppose that each airline takes a short-run perspective and only wants to maximize each week's profits, and that neither one would consider shutting down the route in the foreseeable future. (a) What is the appropriate economic model to study price competition in this market? (b) If you use Nash equilibrium to make a prediction, what…