Suppose that there are two firms producing a homogenous product and competing in Cournot fashion and let the market demand be given by Q = 120 -Assume for simplicity that each firm operates with zero total cost. Suppose that two firms collude. How much more profit each firm can obtain by defecting while the other firm still colludes? %3D
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- Suppose that two firms produce mountain spring water and the market demand for mountain spring water is given as follows: P= 254 - 91 - 92 Firm 1 and Firm 2 have a MC = 50 a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity of each firm. b) Assume now that firm 1 becomes the Stackelberg leader. What will be the market price, output by each firm? Compared to part a, who gains? c) If Firm 1 chooses a quantity, then Firm 2 chooses a quantity (having observed Firm 1's quantity), then Firm 1 has an opportunity to revise its quantity (having observed Firm 2's quantity), then payoffs are determined, does either firm stand to gain relative to the case of simultaneous quantity choice? Why or why not? (hint: there is no need to do any calculation here).Consider a Cournot Oligopoly. One firm has costs C1(Q1) = 12Q1 while the other firm’s cost function is C2(Q2) = 10Q2. The demand for both firms’ products Q=Q1 +Q2 isQD(P)=200−2P. (a) Determine the equilibrium price P, the market shares s1, s2, and the quantities Q1, Q2 produced by both firms. (b) Suppose more firms with the lower cost technology, i.e., with cost function Ci(Qi) = 10Qi enter the market. How many firms with this technology must be in the market such that firm 1’s profit becomes negative. In other words, suppose there is one firm with the high costs, and n firms with the low costs. At what level n will profits of the high-cost firm be negative?Consider a duopoly, i.e., an industry with only two firms: firm A and firm B, making the same product. The industry’s inverse demand is P(Q)=320−(1/5)Q, where P is the market price and Q is the total industry output. Each firm has a marginal cost MC of $20. There are no fixed costs and no barriers to exit the market. a) Suppose that the two firms engage in Cournot competition. Find the equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the profits πANE and πBNE, for each firm. b) Suppose the marginal cost for firm B increases from $20 to $140, while everything else remains unchanged. Find the new equilibrium price PNE in the industry, the new equilibrium outputs QANE and QBNE, as well as the new profits πANE and πBNE for each firm. c) Suppose that, in addition to the marginal cost increase from $20 to $140 from sub question b), firm B also has a fixed cost of $2500, out of which $2100 may be recouped if it shuts down; everything else remains…
- Consider a Cournot Duopoly model. The inverse demand for their products is given byP = 200 − 6Q, where Q is the total quantity supplied in the market (that is, Q = Q1 + Q2). Each firm has an identical cost function, given byT Ci = 2Qi, for i = 1, 2.(a) In the Cournot model, what does each firm choose?(b) What is the timing of each firm’s decision?(c) Find the Nash equilibrium quantities (Q∗1, Q∗2)?(d) What is the equilibrium price? Just help with c and d here pleaseThe figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. (a) At the initial equilibrium, what is total surplus (consumer surplus plus producer surplus)? Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price? (c) The output? (d) Total profit? (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a…The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price?
- The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a monopoly?The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (c) The output? (d) Total profit?If firm 1 and firm 2 are the oligopolistic firms in bottled spring water production in Nomansland. The market demand is given by ? = 5000 −20?, Qd is the number of kilolitres demanded per month while P is the price of kilolitres of bottled water. The marginal cost of a kilolitre of bottled water is R10.How do I Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price? and how do I Find the Cournot profits and the monopolist profits?
- Consider a Cournot duopoly with the inverse demand P = 200 − 2Q. Firm 1 and 2 compete by simultaneously choosing their quantities. Both firms have constant marginal and average cost MC = AC = 20. A) Find each firm’s best response function. Plot the best response functions (label the x-axes as ?1 and y-axes as ?2 ). B) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, profits and market price. Illustrate the equilibrium point on your graph in part (A). C) Suppose instead that firm 1 had MC = AC = 20, but firm 2’s MC = 8. What is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs and profits now? How would this affect your answers to part (B)? ExplainConsider a duopoly in which two identical firms compete by setting their quantities but Firm 1 has first mover advantage (i.e., Firm 1 is the Stackelberg Leader). We want to consider whether Firm 1 should use its advantage to drive Firm 2 out of the market.Try the analysis with an n-firm Cournot oligopoly in which one firm innovates to reduce cost from c to c/2. For this problem, assume n = 2, and use the demand and cost numbers used in the lecture. That is, let inverse market demand be given by P = 100 - Q, and let marginal cost be constant at 50 per unit before the innovation, and 25 per unit after the innovation. (a) Compute what the duopolist stands to gain from innovating. How does it compare to the perfectly competitive firm and to the monopolist? (b) What can you conclude about the relationship between concentration and innovation