A market has the following demand function: P = 120 –Q where Qe = Ei-1 Qi a) Assuming Cournot-Nash market, fill in the table below when firm one has MC, = 10, firm two has MC, = 20 and firm three has MC, = 20. Additionally, there is no Fixed cost for none of the firms. b) Using data from the table below, explain the merger paradox when firms 2 and 3 merge. How the merged firm (firm 2 and 3) will be worse off? c) How would this outcome differ if all three firms merged?
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- Assuming Cournot-Nash market, fill in the table below when firm one has MC, = 10, firm two has MC2 = 20 and firm three has MC3 = 20. Additionally, there is no Fixed cost for none of the firms.Using data from the table below, explain the merger paradox when firms 2 and 3 merge. How the merged firm (firm 2 and 3) will be worse off?How would this outcome differ if all three firms merged?Suppose that two firms produce mountain spring water and the market demand for mountain spring water is given as follows: P= 254 - 91 - 92 Firm 1 and Firm 2 have a MC = 50 a) Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity of each firm. b) Assume now that firm 1 becomes the Stackelberg leader. What will be the market price, output by each firm? Compared to part a, who gains? c) If Firm 1 chooses a quantity, then Firm 2 chooses a quantity (having observed Firm 1's quantity), then Firm 1 has an opportunity to revise its quantity (having observed Firm 2's quantity), then payoffs are determined, does either firm stand to gain relative to the case of simultaneous quantity choice? Why or why not? (hint: there is no need to do any calculation here).Consider duopoly model with firm 1 and firm 2. Firms have constant marginal costs, c_1 = c_2 = 10. Demand functions are given by equations: Q_1= (7*100) - 2*P_1 + P_2 Q_2 = (7*100) + P_1 - 2*P_ 2 Note that * signifies the multiplication sign. Firms play a simultaneous moves game where each store chooses its own price. Find each firms’ best response functions. Draw the best response functions of each firm. Label the graph properly. Is this a game of strategic substitutes or strategic complements? Why? Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. Find the profits each firm receives.
- You are the manager in a market composed of eight firms, each of which has a 12.5 percent market share. In addition, each firm has a strong financial position and is located within a 100-mile radius of its competitors. a. Calculate the premerger Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for this market. b. Suppose that any two of these firms merge. What is the postmerger HHI? c. Based only on the information contained in this question and on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines described in this chapter, do you think the Justice Department (or FTC) would attempt to block a merger between any two of the firms? ExplainConsider a Cournot Oligopoly. One firm has costs C1(Q1) = 12Q1 while the other firm’s cost function is C2(Q2) = 10Q2. The demand for both firms’ products Q=Q1 +Q2 isQD(P)=200−2P. (a) Determine the equilibrium price P, the market shares s1, s2, and the quantities Q1, Q2 produced by both firms. (b) Suppose more firms with the lower cost technology, i.e., with cost function Ci(Qi) = 10Qi enter the market. How many firms with this technology must be in the market such that firm 1’s profit becomes negative. In other words, suppose there is one firm with the high costs, and n firms with the low costs. At what level n will profits of the high-cost firm be negative?Two firms - firm 1 and firm 2 - share a market for a specific product. Both have zero marginal cost. They compete in the manner of Bertrand and the market demand for the product is given by: q = 20 − min{p1, p2}. 1. What are the equilibrium prices and profits? 2. Suppose the two firms have signed a collusion contract, that is, they agree to set the same price and share the market equally. What is the price they would set and what would be their profits? For the following parts, suppose the Bertrand game is played for infinitely many times with discount factor for both firms δ ∈ [0, 1). 3. Let both players adopt the following strategy: start with collusion; maintain the collusive price as long as no one has ever deviated before; otherwise set the Bertrand price. What is the minimum value of δ for which this is a SPNE. 4. Suppose the policy maker has imposed a price floor p = 4, that is, neither firm is allowed to set a price below $4. How does your answer to part 3 change? Is it now…
- The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. (a) At the initial equilibrium, what is total surplus (consumer surplus plus producer surplus)? Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price? (c) The output? (d) Total profit? (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a…The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price?The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a monopoly?
- The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (c) The output? (d) Total profit?Three firms compete in the style of Cournot. All firms have a constant returns to scale technology: There are no fixed cost and each firm's marginal cost is constant. The market demand is given by Q(P) = 9 - P. Firm 1's marginal cost is MC1 = 1, firm 2's marginal cost is MC2 = 2. Let MC3 be the marginal cost of Firm 3. Which of the below is a necessary condition so that q > 0 for all three firms in a Nash equilibrium? a. MC3 < 1 b. MC3 < 4 c. MC3 < 3 d. MC3 > 1 e. MC3 < 2Firms A and B operate in a market with inverse demand given by p = 160 - (q_{A} + q_{B}) Their total cost functions are C_{A}(q_{A}) = q_{A} ^ 2 / 2 and C_{B}(q_{B}) = q_{B} ^ 2 / 2 , respectively. The firms compete in quantities (Cournot competition). Denote by q_{A} ^ C and q_{B} ^ C the Nash equilibrium quantities in this game. What are q_{A} ^ C and q_{B} ^ C Hint: Again, note that I gave you the total cost function for each firm, not the marginal costs. (a) q_{A} ^ C = 24 q_{B} ^ C = 24 (b) q_{A} ^ C = 60 q_{B} ^ C = 30 (c) q_{A} ^ C = 40 q_{B} ^ C = 40 (d) q_{A} ^ C = 20 q_{B} ^ C = 20 (e) q_{A} ^ C = 30 q_{B} ^ C = 30