Suppose two firms compete as Bertrand duopolists for an identical product, where demand is given by Q = 5000 – 50P and both firms have marginal cost of 10 per unit of output. If firm 1 has capacity of 1500 and firm 2 has capacity of 2000, what will the equilibrium price be in this market?

Suppose two firms compete as Bertrand duopolists for an identical product, where demand is given by Q = 5000 – 50P and both firms have marginal cost of 10 per unit of output. If firm 1 has capacity of 1500 and firm 2 has capacity of 2000, what will the equilibrium price be in this market?

Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)

9th Edition

ISBN:9781305260948

Author:Irvin B. Tucker

Publisher:Irvin B. Tucker

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19SQ

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