Suppose you own a house worth $500. However, there is a risk the house could burn down. If the house burns down, it will only be worth $25. There is a 5% chance the house burns down. However, you can buy insurance that will pay you if in the event the house burns down. Call the amount of insurance purchased K. The premium you have to pay for K dollars of insurance is 0.05×K. So, if hypothetically you wanted $100 of insurance, the premium would be $5. Assume you have log-utility u(x) = ln(x). What is the optimal amount of insurance, K ∗ ? (Note: the premium must be paid whether the house burns down or not.)

Suppose you own a house worth $500. However, there is a risk the house could burn down. If the house burns down, it will only be worth $25. There is a 5% chance the house burns down. However, you can buy insurance that will pay you if in the event the house burns down. Call the amount of insurance purchased K. The premium you have to pay for K dollars of insurance is 0.05×K. So, if hypothetically you wanted $100 of insurance, the premium would be $5. Assume you have log-utility u(x) = ln(x). What is the optimal amount of insurance, K ∗ ? (Note: the premium must be paid whether the house burns down or not.)

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17.2IP

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Suppose you own a house worth $500. However, there is a risk the house could burn down. If the house burns down, it will only be worth $25. There is a 5% chance the house burns down. However, you can buy insurance that will pay you if in the event the house burns down. Call the amount of insurance purchased K. The premium you have to pay for K dollars of insurance is 0.05×K. So, if hypothetically you wanted $100 of insurance, the premium would be $5. Assume you have log-utility u(x) = ln(x). What is the optimal amount of insurance, K ∗ ? (Note: the premium must be paid whether the house burns down or not.)
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