The table below shows revenue data for different firms producing cleaning products. Use the given information to calculate thesquared value of the market share of each firm.Firm←Aardvark IncBuzzy CoCorky CoDelta CoEagle IncFarriss CoMarket Share in %What is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for this market?211018211217MS SquaredA->A→←

The table below shows revenue data for different firms producing cleaning products. Use the given information to calculate the squared value of the market share of each firm. Firm 9. Aardvark Inc Buzzy Co Corky Co Delta Co Eagle Inc Farriss Co Market Share in % 21 What is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for this market? 10 18 21 12 17 MS Squared

The table below shows revenue data for different firms producing cleaning products. Use the given information to calculate the squared value of the market share of each firm. Firm 9. Aardvark Inc Buzzy Co Corky Co Delta Co Eagle Inc Farriss Co Market Share in % 21 What is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for this market? 10 18 21 12 17 MS Squared

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter15: Oligopoly And Strategic Behavior

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9P

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Inverse elasticity rule Use the first-order condition (Equation 15.2 ) for a Cournot firm to show that the usual inverse elasticity rule from Chapter 11 holds under Cournot competition (where the elasticity is associated with an individual firm's residual demand, the demand left after all rivals sell their output on the market). Manipulate Equation 15.2 in a different way to obtain an equivalent version of the inverse elasticity rule: pMCp=sieQ,p , where si=qi/Q is firm i's market share and eQp is the elasticity of market demand. Compare this version of the inverse elasticity rule with that for a monopolist from the previous chapter.
9.17. Number of competitors. Consider an n firm homogeneous-good oligopoly with constant marginal cost, the same for all firms. Let d ̄ be the minimum value of the dis- count factor such that it is possible to sustain monopoly prices in a collusive agreement. Show that d ̄ is decreasing in n. Interpret the result.
Only typed answer Assume that the demand for a standard (i.e. non-luxury seat) ticket to a Cleveland Indians game is represented by the function: P = 80 – 0.625Q and MR = 80 – 1.25Q and MC = 30 a. What single price will maximize monopoly profit? b. What will be the prices and quantity under two-part pricing? c. Calculate and compare the profits for each option.
True/False 1. In a principal-agent relationship between owner and manager with hidden e§ort, the owner can design a wage scheme that insures the optimal Örst best e§ort by the manager regardless of the risk aversion of the manager. Justify your answer. 2. Consider a monopoly that faces an inverse demand curve and has a linear cost function. The monopoly would be indi§erent when maximizing proÖts between either choosing quantities or choosing prices. 3. A multiproduct Örm that as monopoly power over several products sets lower prices than separate Örms (each controlling a single product) when the products are substitutes or when there are economies of scope. 4. In the dominant Örm model (‡ la Hotelling) an increase in the marginal cost of the dominant Örm (with constant marginal costs) implies that proÖts necessarily decrease. 5. Suppose that an industry has 10 Örms where the market shares are ordered from the most to the least dominant Örm f0:5; 0:37; 0:05; 0:03; 0:02; 0:01;…
Assume the laptop market has 5 participants, each accounting for 20% of market share. Now two of the competitors decide to merge, how would this change the HH index? Would the proposed deal likely raise FTC’s concerns on reduced competition? a. Increase by 400. No. b. Increase by 400. Yes. c. Increase by 800. No. d. Increase by 800. Yes.
Ugly Dolls Inc. (UD) is a firm in Mytown that sells its products on a market under monopolistic competition. The cost function of UD is represented by TC = 100+10Q. Lately, because of the UD is making a big amount of profit, some firms enter the market to compete. Assume that Mytown engages in free trade in the dolls markets with Yourtown, who also faces a market with monopolistic competition. Because of this we can expect that, (a) The numbers of firms operating in this market will not change. (b) At equilibrium the profit of firms will increase. (c) The quantity of types of dolls available to consumers will increase. (d) All the above answers are correct.
(Market Entry Deterrence): NSG is considering entry into the local phone market inthe Bay Area. The incumbent S&P, predicts that a price war will result if NSG enters. If NSG staysout, S&P earns monopoly profits valued at $10 million (net present value, or NPV of profits),while NSG earns zero. If NSG enters, it must incur irreversible entry costs of $2 million. If there isa price war, each firm earns $1 million (NPV). S&P always has the option of accommodatingentry (i.e., not starting a price war). In such a case, both firms earn $4 million (NPV). Supposethat the timing is such that NSG first has to choose whether or not to enter the market. ThenS&P decides whether to “accommodate entry” or “engage in a price war.”a. Model this as a dynamic game and draw the game tree.b. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome to this sequential game?
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Suppose the European Union (EU) is investigating a proposed merger between two of largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on estimates from the EU’s economists, these two firms have a combined market share of about two-thirds of all sales in the relevant market. The only remaining firm controls the other one-third of the market. Economists have estimated that the wholesale market price elasticity of demand for Scotch is −1.3 and the unit cost to produce and distribute the Scotch is 16.20 per liter. Using the available information, provide quantitative estimates of the pre- and post-merger prices for Scotch in the wholesale market. In your opinion, is the EU’s concern about the merger justified? Why or Why not?
Two firms dominate the market for surgical sutures and competeaggressively with respect to research and development. The followingpayoff table depicts the profit implications of their different R&Dstrategies.a. Suppose that no communication is possible between the firms; eachmust choose its R&D strategy independently of the other. Whatactions will the firms take, and what is the outcome?b. If the firms can communicate before setting their R&D strategies,what outcome will occur? Explain.Firm B’s R&D SpendingLow Medium HighLow 8, 11 6, 12 5, 14Firm A’s R&D Medium 12, 9 8, 10 6, 8 SpendingHigh 11, 6 10, 8 4, 6
Consider any market that has a demand curve given by: Qd = 125 - 0.4P. Being the total quantity demanded in the market, given the quantity in millions of units and the market price, calculated in monetary units. Imagine that there are 2 Cournot oligopolists operating in this market that have Cmg = CVme = 2. About this market, the question is: a) What is the reaction curvature of the oligopolists? b) What will be the production of each of the companies? c) What is the sale price for oligopolists?
Suppose a monopoly market has a demand function in whichquantity demanded depends not only on market price (P) butalso on the amount of advertising the firm does (A, measuredin dollars). The specific form of this function isQ =(20 - P2) (1 + 0.1A - 0.01A2).The monopolistic firm’s cost function is given byC = 10Q + 15 + A.a. Suppose there is no advertising (A = 0). What outputwill the profit-maximizing firm choose? What market price will this yield? What will be the monopoly’sprofits?b. Now let the firm also choose its optimal level of advertising expenditure. In this situation, what output levelwill be chosen? What price will this yield? What will thelevel of advertising be? What are the firm’s profits in thiscase? Hint: This can be worked out most easily by assuming the monopoly chooses the profit-maximizing pricerather than quantity.