There are two types of consumers in Melbourne: students and non-students. The student population is 10, and each student’s demand of printing paper is Q=1−p, for p<1.The non-student population is 40, and each non-student’s demand of printing paper is Q=3−p, for p<3. Suppose OfficeMax is the only seller of printing paper in Melbourne. Assume zero production cost. Suppose OfficeMax offers a student discount, $1, so students only pay $0.50 and non-students pay the full price, $1.50. What is the deadweight loss in this situation?

There are two types of consumers in Melbourne: students and non-students. The student population is 10, and each student’s demand of printing paper is Q=1−p, for p<1.The non-student population is 40, and each non-student’s demand of printing paper is Q=3−p, for p<3. Suppose OfficeMax is the only seller of printing paper in Melbourne. Assume zero production cost. Suppose OfficeMax offers a student discount, $1, so students only pay $0.50 and non-students pay the full price, $1.50. What is the deadweight loss in this situation?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.4P

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There are two types of consumers in Melbourne: students and non-students. The student population is 10, and each student’s demand of printing paper is Q=1−P, for P<1.The non-student population is 40, and each non-student’s demand of printing paper is Q=3−P, for P<3. Suppose OfficeMax is the only seller of printing paper in Melbourne. Assume zero production cost. Suppose OfficeMax cannot offer student discounts, and every customer has to pay the same price P. Derive the aggregate demand curve (for both students and non-students), and illustrate it in a diagram.
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There are two types of consumers in Melbourne: students and non-students. The student population is 10, and each student’s demand of printing paper is Q=1−P, for P<1.The non-student population is 40, and each non-student’s demand of printing paper is Q=3−P, for P<3. Suppose OfficeMax is the only seller of printing paper in Melbourne. Assume zero production cost. Given the optimal price is 1.30, compute the consumer surplus for students, consumer surplus for non-students, and producer surplus.
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There are two types of consumers in Melbourne: students and non-students. The student population is 10, and each student’s demand of printing paper is Q=1−?, for ?<1.The non-student population is 40, and each non-student’sdemand of printing paper is Q=3−?, for ?<3. Suppose OfficeMax is the only seller of printing paper in Melbourne. Assume zero production cost. Suppose OfficeMax offers a student discount, d, so students only pay d*p and non-students pay the full price, p. What are the profit maximizing price and discount d?