Two firms producing identical products may merge due to the existence ofMultiple Choleeeconomies of scope.economies of scalecost complementaritiesAl of the statemens are conect

Answered: Two firms produding identical products…

Two firms produding identical products may merge due to the existence of Mutple Chelce econemes of scope. economies of scele cost comp All of the stetemeno

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter1: Introduction And Goals Of The Firm

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1.1CE

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COURSE: MICROECONOMICS - Cournot Model:In the market for a given good there are only 2 firms satisfying the demand, and their respective total cost functions respond to the form: CTi = 10Qi + 5 and the demand is estimated to be: P = 31 - QIf the decision variable for both firms is that the quantity they will produce and realize will be decided simultaneously it is asked to:(a) calculate the profit and reaction function of each firmb) graph market equilibriumc) calculate the profits that both companies will obtain in equilibrium
Dr. Heinz Doofenshmirtz and Perry the Platipus have decided to venture into farming. They both participated in the venture eqully well, so at the end of the year, their farm produced five geese, each laying golden egs. Perry and Dr. Doof have to decide how to divide these five geese among themselves -- there are no market where they could sell them and there is not sharing or time-share arrangements possible. In other words, either they use the goose or loose it. Evidently, they cannot split an egg-laying goose in half.(a) Give an example of economically efficient allocation of golden egg laying geese between Perry and Dr. Doof. Briefly explain why the allocation you provide is efficient. (b) Give an example of an allocation of geese between the two that you think is fair (equitable). Briefly explain why it is fair in your opinion. (c) If the allocation in (a) is not the same as the one in (b), is it possible to come up with an allocation of geese that would be both efficient and…
Consider a small town with two competing restaurants: Doug’s Diner and Betty’s Bistro. There is 1000profit to be made in the market. Each period, the restaurants simultaneously decide whether to offer high orlow quality food. In order to offer high quality food, each restaurant must hire an expert chef, which incursan additional cost of 100. The restaurants split the profit equally if they offer the same quality of food. Ifone restaurant offers high quality food while the other offers low quality food, the high quality restauranttakes four fifths of the profit and the low quality restaurant takes one fifth of the profit.(a) Draw up the normal form game matrix, showing the players, strategies, and payoffs.(b) Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game.(c) Explain how the restaurant owners could both be better off than in the Nash equilibrium if they wereable to cooperate. Is the town as a whole better off or worse off when the firms cooperate? Why or whynot
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Each time a song is played on the radio, the record company and the songwriter are paid a royalty of $0.30.Of the total, 75% goes to the company and the rest to the writer. If on a network of 50 radio stations, a certainsong is played 4 times a day during the first week and then 20 times a day for the next three weeks, how muchdoes the network owe in royalties for the four weeks? How much do the record company and the songwriterreceive each
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Adani Shantigram is a picturesque township on Ahmedabad-Gandhinagarhighway. The statement ‘The Good quality life’ shows the commitment ofthe developer towards ensuring that the residents enjoy all the amenitiesand services in the township at least cost and inconvenience. In order toensure competitive outcome, ATRICO (Adani Real Estate Arm) hasensured that for all the important services, many service providers arepresent, so that none of them can charge a high monopoly price from theresidents. Therefore, there are 4 milk parlours, 4 laundromats, 4photocopiers, 4 beauty saloons and 4 grocers in the township. Thisnumber ‘4’ has been decided in a high level meeting, where this wasdiscussed that having less than 4 will result in duopoly/tight oligopoly,and having more than 4 will require more space and therefore notpreferred.Last month, the ladies in ‘Water Lily’ complained that the prices chargedby beauty saloons in the township are very high. In order to address thecomplaints, details…
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ANS ME ! 1 In a completely serious market, the interaction of section or leave closes when a. Firms are working with abundance limit. b. Firms are making zero monetary benefit. c. Firms experience diminishing minimal income. d. Cost is equivalent to minor expense. 2. Harmony amounts in business sectors described by oligopoly is a. Lower than in imposing business model business sectors and higher than in completely serious markets. b. Lower than in imposing business model business sectors and lower than in completely serious markets. c. Higher than in imposing business model business sectors and higher than in completely serious markets.
Exercise 3.17 (competitive product market interac- tions). There is a mass 1 of identical entrepreneurs with the variable-investment technology described in Section 3.4. The representative entrepreneur has wealth A, is risk neutral, and is protected by limited liability. Denote the average investment by I and the indi- vidual investment i (in equilibrium i = I by symme- try but we need to distinguish the two in a ﬁrst step in order to compute the competitive equilibrium). A project produces Ri units of goods when successful and 0 when it fails. The probability of success is pH in the case of good behavior (the entrepreneur receives no private beneﬁt) and pL = pH − ∆p in the case of misbehavior (the entrepreneur then receives private beneﬁt Bi). Assume that it is optimal to induce the entrepreneur to behave. The market price of output is P = P(Q), with P' 0, where Q is aggregate production (with P(Q) tend- R ≡ RS…
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