Two officers are working in a police department. During a working day Officer One can either catch 20 criminals or she can write 60 reports. During a working day Officer Two can either catch 2 criminals of she can write 21 reports. The boss of the officers has the following utility function U=min(criminals; reports). Officers want to make their boss as happy as possible. Find how many criminals will be optimally caught during the day.

Two officers are working in a police department. During a working day Officer One can either catch 20 criminals or she can write 60 reports. During a working day Officer Two can either catch 2 criminals of she can write 21 reports. The boss of the officers has the following utility function U=min(criminals; reports). Officers want to make their boss as happy as possible. Find how many criminals will be optimally caught during the day.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

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