Two players simultancously choose some ponitive integer (denote them zy and ay). If the sum of the integers does not exceed 100, then first player gets z and second player gets , otherwise both players get aero. Find all pure strategy equilibria of the game.

Two players simultancously choose some ponitive integer (denote them zy and ay). If the sum of the integers does not exceed 100, then first player gets z and second player gets , otherwise both players get aero. Find all pure strategy equilibria of the game.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5E

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Two players simultancously choose some ponitive integer (denote them z and za). If the sum of the integers
does not exceed 100, then first player gets z1 and second player gets z, otherwise both players get zero.
Find all pure strategy equilibria of the game.

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