U9. Consider a revised version of the game from Exercise S9: PROFESSOR PLUM Revolver Knife Wrench Conservatory 1,3 2,-2 0,6 MRS. PEACOCK Ballroom 3,2 1,4 5,0 (a) Graph the expected payoffs from each of Professor Plum's strategies as a function of Mrs. Peacock's p-mix. (b) Which strategies will Professor Plum use in his equilibrium mixture? Why? (c) What is the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game?
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- Consider the following game 1\2 Y Z A 10,3 3,9 B 8,5 6,1 Suppose Player 2 holds the following belief about Player 1: θ1 (A,B) = (9/10,1/10) What is the expected payoff from playing ‘Y’ ? What is the expected payoff from playing ‘Z’ ? Based on these beliefs, player 2 should respond by playing _____Find all NE of the stage game.(b) Consider a two-period game without discounting in which the stage game is played ineach period. Find all pure strategy SPNE.(c) What’s the min-max payoff of each player?(c1) Consider pure strategies only.(c2) Consider all strategies, including the mixed ones.(d) Now suppose the stage game is repeated infinitely many times. Use the Fudenberg-Maskin Folk theorem to find all possible values of payoff that can be supported as aSPNE.Question 1 Consider a first-price sealed bid auction of a single object with two biddersj = 1,2 and no reservation price. Bidder 1′s valuation is v1 = 2, and bidder 2′s valuation isv1 = 5. Both v1 and v2 are known to both bidders. Bids must be in whole dollar amounts.In the event of a tie, the object is awarded by a flip of a fair coin.(a) Find an equilibrium of this game.(b) Is the allocation of your answer to (a) efficient?
- Consider the game of Chicken in which each player has the option to “get out of the way” and “hang tough” with payoffs: Get out of the way Hang tough Get out of the way 2,2 1,3 Hang tough 3,1 00 a. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria, if they exist b. Let k be the probability that player 1 chooses “hang tough” and u be the probability that player two chooses “hang tough.” Find the mixed stragety Nash equilibria, if they existThe mixed stratergy nash equalibrium consists of : the probability of firm A selecting October is 0.692 and probability of firm A selecting December is 0.309. The probability of firm B selecting October is 0.5 and probability of firm selecting December is 0.5. In the equilibrium you calculated above, what is the probability that both consoles are released in October? In December? What are the expected payoffs of firm A and of firm B in equilibrium?(a) Calculate the safety levels of both players.(b) Find the set of all Nash equilibria (pure and mixed).
- 4. The preferences of agents A and B are representable by expected utility functions such that uA(x) = 5x^1/3 +30, and uB(x)= 1/5x - 20. Then, the following allocation of the expected returns of a risky joint investment of A and B as represented by lottery L = ((2/3);1500), (1/3);120)) is Pareto efficient: (a) xA = (500,100), xB = (1000,20) (b) xA = (100,100), xB= (1300,20) (c) xA= (80,80), xB = (1420,40) (d) xA = (750,60), xB= (750,60) (e) NOPACConsider the following 3×3 two player normal form game that is being repeated infinite number of times. The discounting factor for player 1 is δ1 and the discounting factor for player 2 is δ2. left center right up (10 ,40) (32 ,75) (65 ,58) middle (55 ,63) (21 ,45) (23 ,83) down (14 ,76) (16 ,65) (37 ,42) a. Find the total discounted utility for player 2 if player 1 decides to play middle all the time and player 2 decides to play left all the time. b. Now suppose both players are following the strategy of part (a) until player 1 decides to play up in the 6th stage. The the new NE after the 6th stage is (up,right). Find the total discounted utility for player 2 in this case. c. Using the grim trigger strategy, find the minimum value of δ2. Can you find any anomaly in your calculated value of δ2?For questions 32 - 35 consider the following "research and development" game. Firms A and B are contemplating whether or not to invest in R8D. Each has two options: "Invest" and "Abstain." A firm that invests will invent product X with a probability of 0.5, whereas a firm that abstains is incapable of invention. Investment costs $6. If a firm doesn't invent X. it makes 50 in revenue. If a firm invests and is the only one to invent X. it becomes a monopolist and generates $20 in revenue. If both firms invent X, each firm becomes a duopolist, and generates $8 in revenue. Revenues are gross figures (i.e. they are not net of investment costs), and there are no costs besides investments costs (i.e. no variable cost of production etc.). The firms are risk-neutral entities, and are uninformed of each other's investment decisions. Find the Nash Equilibrium (or Equilibria) of the "research and development" game. A. There are no Nash Equilibria B. Invest/Invest C. Invest/Abstain, and…
- For questions 32 - 35 consider the following "research and development" game. Firms A and B are contemplating whether or not to invest in R8D. Each has two options: "Invest" and "Abstain." A firm that invests will invent product X with a probability of 0.5, whereas a firm that abstains is incapable of invention. Investment costs $6. If a firm doesn't invent X. it makes 50 in revenue. If a firm invests and is the only one to invent X. it becomes a monopolist and generates $20 in revenue. If both firms invent X, each firm becomes a duopolist, and generates $8 in revenue. Revenues are gross figures (i.e. they are not net of investment costs), and there are no costs besides investments costs (i.e. no variable cost of production etc.). The firms are risk-neutral entities, and are uninformed of each other's investment decisions. Find the Nash Equilibrium (or Equilibria) of the "research and development" game. There are no Nash Equilibria Invest/Invest Invest/Abstain, and Abstain/Invests…ollowing is the payoff table for the Pittsburgh Development Corporation (PDC) Condominium Project. Amounts are in millions of dollars. State of Nature Decision Alternative Strong Demand S1 Weak Demand S2 Small complex, d1 8 7 Medium complex, d2 14 5 Large complex, d3 20 -9 Suppose PDC is optimistic about the potential for the luxury high-rise condominium complex and that this optimism leads to an initial subjective probability assessment of 0.8 that demand will be strong (S1) and a corresponding probability of 0.2 that demand will be weak (S2). Assume the decision alternative to build the large condominium complex was found to be optimal using the expected value approach. Also, a sensitivity analysis was conducted for the payoffs associated with this decision alternative. It was found that the large complex remained optimal as long as the payoff for the strong demand was greater than or equal to $17.5 million and as long as the payoff for…See the extensive form game image attached. 1) Solve the game by backward induction 2) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (in complete contingent plans)of the extensive-form game (no need to write down thenormal-form representation)