P A (12, 12) B (26,70) C (11,0) (3,25) (24,26) D (5,-10) (16,-8) (13,-8) R (8,-5) (-2,6) S (25, 14) (20, 100) T (50, 12) (22, 75) (50,26) (50,-20) a. Find the Nash equilibria of the game using any suitable method. b. Apply Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions (IESDA) to this game. Explain the steps as necessary. Do the Nash equilibria found in part a. survive IESDA? S c. Apply Iterated Elimination of (Weakly) Dominated Actions (IEDA) to this game by elim- inating all whakly dominated actions in each round. Explain the steps as necessary. Do the Nash couilibria found in na

P A (12, 12) B (26,70) C (11,0) (3,25) (24,26) D (5,-10) (16,-8) (13,-8) R (8,-5) (-2,6) S (25, 14) (20, 100) T (50, 12) (22, 75) (50,26) (50,-20) a. Find the Nash equilibria of the game using any suitable method. b. Apply Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions (IESDA) to this game. Explain the steps as necessary. Do the Nash equilibria found in part a. survive IESDA? S c. Apply Iterated Elimination of (Weakly) Dominated Actions (IEDA) to this game by elim- inating all whakly dominated actions in each round. Explain the steps as necessary. Do the Nash couilibria found in na

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.6P

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