Marine Air-Ground Task Force

island of Bikini Atoll. Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, United States Marine Corps observed the test and recognized that atomic bombs could render amphibious assaults useless due to the dense concentration of troops, ships, and supplies at the beachheads. To reduce the possibility of nuclear bombs being used to combat amphibious assaults, dispersion would be crucial; however, this would lead to a slower consolidation of forces ashore. New ways to achieve dispersion without sacrificing speed were

administration felt the need to intervene with military force to normalize the situation. Operation Urgent Fury could have been more successful if U.S. forces had sufficient intelligence to include enemy disposition, adequate maps and known locations of all the U.S. medical students located on and outside of the campus St. George’s University Medical

employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets.” The U.S. Marine Corps performed special operations from its inception: The 1776 raid on New Providence in the Bahamas provides an early example. In the twentieth century’s “Banana Wars,” Marines battled insurgents, advised and led friendly local forces, and provided civil governance

Lieutenant General (LTG) Richard F. Natonski, United States Marine Corps, commanded the 1st Marine Division during the Second Battle of Fallujah, also referred to as Operation Phantom Fury. As a Major General (MG), Richard Natonski led the 1st Marine Division, ground combat forces of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and several United States Army forces during a joint forces attack on Fallujah, Iraq with American, Iraqi, and British armed forces. During the course of this 4-day attack on Fallujah

US forces are authorized to conduct air and naval operations in support of ROK, south of the 38th Parallel. North Korea wasted no time in rapidly seizing Seoul by the 28th of June. Shortly after, the US Navy initiated its now authorized blockade of the peninsula as US ground forces were allowed to perform support roles for the ROK military, which quickly transitioned to full combatant roles. July 1st saw the deployment of Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker’s 8th Army advance forces, Task Force

directive coordinators in military air combat commands have incessantly wondered whether their technical directive processing and implementation could ever be organized proficiently. Because technical directive coordination and implementation is arguably the most task saturated program to manage; this research paper through quantitative analysis, analyzed the correlation between technical directive processing and flight operations in air command Helicopter Marine Light Attack squadron 469 over a 24

As Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford emphasized in his February 26, 2015 statement to the house subcommittee on defense, “The challenges of the future operating environment will demand that our Nation maintains a force-in-readiness that is capable of global response.” Given today's fiscally constrained environment, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) continues to experiment with new tactics, techniques, and procedures to enable mission efficiency and improve combat effectiveness. Recognizing

States’ armed forces and other coalition forces encountered an estimated 1,000 enemy troops and killed hundreds during Operation Anaconda. However, defeating these enemy forces required commanders and staff members to scramble to coordinate and rush reinforcements into battle after the shooting begun. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain headquarters failure to establish and maintain tactical control, operational control, or situational awareness (SA) of special operations forces and other

Unity of Command during Operation Anaconda “Unity of command is defined as all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a common purpose.” (Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2013, p. V-1). Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain only had tactical control of some of the organizations involved and due to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) not being centrally located this caused delays in decision making. Even

Admiral Wesley L. McDonald appointed Major General Edward Trobaugh as the Commander of Combined Forces Grenada. Although combat operations had ceased, there was still a lot of work required before Operation Urgent Fury would be complete. The 82nd Airborne Division, which peaked at 6000 Soldiers on November 3rd, would not completely redeploy until the new Grenadian government was set up and operational. This task took exactly 48 days and the last unit from the 82nd Airborne Division landed at Fort Bragg