Propositional attitude

This paper will explore one of the three problems raised by Stich, in Chapter 7 of his work Cognitive Science and the Concept of Belief, for Fodor’s account of propositional attitudes. It will begin with a brief explanation of Fodor’s theory of folk psychology and his ideas of propositional attitudes, and will continue with an in depth analysis of Stich’s critique of Fodor’s representational theory of mind, specifically Stich’s discussion of the problems posed by ideological similarity and the consequences

folk psychology by claiming that people will discover that there is no neural basis to mental entities and thus, they are non-existent. I shall argue that there are significant fundamental flaws to both the arguments for eliminativism about propositional attitudes and eliminativism about qualia (subjective experience). For the former, I will argue that the eliminative materialist’s theory-theory is flawed and show that propositions alone can discredit the position on philosophy of mind. This will lead

In this paper, I will consider whether experiences of secondary qualities can fit into the theoretical framework of functionalism. I will begin this discussion by thoroughly explicating functionalism and the threat posed to it by secondary qualities. I will then consider Nida-Rümelin’s inverted qualia argument and will contend that it employs a false conception of color perception. Finally, I will argue that experiences of secondary qualities may be analyzed through the functionalist model only after

Internalism Internalism is the belief that justification for beliefs comes only from internal mental states or that the mind of the person is the factor in justification. The basis for internalism is that reasoning with the information that you possess is how you produce beliefs that are justified. Reasoning is done internally which shows that justification for beliefs are internal. This concept for internalists is believed to be all-encompassing because all justified beliefs are produced by internal

Memory view is associated with Personal Identity where in which it is (Personal Identity) made up by memory-relations. These are where a person consists of a set of person-stages linked by (genuine) memory-relations. Memory view is largely made up of genuine and apparent memories although Genuine memory is the same as apparent memory provided that the person with the apparent memory really experienced the event. It is viewed as being something that is purely made up of mental and psychological factors

A veteran comes back from the war in Vietnam. Some people acknowledge him for his services and some people dishonor him for what he did in the war. For example, someone sees a veteran with PTSD and tells him he is overreacting from what he’d seen. In fact, they do not know what the man has gone through and why he is acting the way he is. In this essay, many people treat veterans with disrespect consequently as if he or she did something wrong. Returning veterans or people are being treated with either

Define state consciousness and the phenomenal aspect of conscious (When we say a mental state is state conscious we mean to identify not only that there is a relational property that we attribute to that mental state, namely, state consciousness, but also that there is something it’s like, an affiliated phenomenal character, for the bearer of that state.) MAKE SURE YOU PROPERLY TIE IN HOW PHENOMENAL ASPECT LINKS IN AND HOW IT LINKS IN WITH STATE CONSCIOUS, that they actually link in there’s just

In Fyodor Dostoevsky’s novel Crime and Punishment, great attention is paid to Raskolnikov’s inner life, yet it is equally important to attend to those outside forces that affect him. A significant but overlooked part of the novel, then, is how the city of St. Petersburg affects Raskolnikov. Through my reading, I found it interesting that Raskolnikov regularly traverses the city’s bridges and uses them as a place for reflection. Overall, there are twenty-five appearances of the word “bridge” in the

Indexicals are important distinguishers of context within sentences. They are expressions that can be uttered by multiple speakers, and have a different meaning or implication each time it is spoken. For me to say “I am Sarah Elshater” has one meaning, for my older brother to say “I am Sarah Elshater” has a completely separate meaning –and would likely cause concern within my family should he say such a thing. In The Problem of the Essential Indexical by John Perry, the notion of “locating beliefs”

Reflexive Transparency, Mental Content, and Externalism It has been disputed whether an externalist conception of the individuation of intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, is compatible with self-knowledge, that is, the claim that one's judgments about one's intentional states are non-evidential, non-inferential, and authoritative. I want to argue that these theses are indeed incompatible, notwithstanding an important objection to this incompatibility claim. The worry has been raised