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Subject
Economics
Date
Feb 20, 2024
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9
Uploaded by LieutenantTree13612
Question 1: Risk Preferences A
lvaro
and Estela
live in the village of Los Reyes in the state of Michoacan, Mexico
1
. They
each
have zero wealth, so their consumption is equal to the income they earn from their economic activity. Each of them must choose one (and only one) of the following three activities: •
Activity 1: Full time farming. Strawberry farming is risky because of a combination of weather
and pests. Under full time farming, the farmer works 7 days per week on their farm. There is
a 65
% probability of having a GOOD harvest and a 35
% chan
c
e of having a BAD harvest. If
the harvest is GOOD, the farmer earns an income of $200. If the harvest is BAD, the farmer
earns an income of only $50.
•
Activity 2: Full time construction work. This activity has no risk. An individual who decides
to work full time in construction earns $1
44
with certainty.
•
Activity 3: Part-time farming. In this third activity, the farmer works during the week as a
strawberry farmer and works in construction during the weekend. Since he is not able to work
full time on the farm, the probability of having a GOOD harvest and earning $200 drops to
4
0%, and the probability of having a BAD harvest and earning only $50 increases to 6
0%. The
individual also earns $25 with certainty as a construction worker (the person earns this $25
from construction in addition to
his farm income under both a GOOD and BAD harvest).
(a)
What is the expected value of consumption for each activity? Report your answers in Table
1 below.
Table 1 Activity Expected Value of Consumption: E(C) 1: Full time farming 2: Full time construction work 3: Part time farming 1
Mexico has become one of the leading exporters of strawberries in the past 15 years. Michoacan is the most important strawberry producing region in Mexico.
(0.65×200)+(0.35×50) = 147.5
144
(0.40×200+25) + (0.60×50+25)= 135
We also know that A
lavaro
and Estela
view risk differently, and that is why they have different utility functions (listed below). A
lvaro
: Estela
: ?(𝐶)
=
2𝐶
?(𝐶)
=
√𝐶 (b)
Using those utility function
s
, compute the certainty equivalent (CE), the risk premium (RP)
and expected utility (EU) associated with each of the three activities for each individual.
Report your answers in Table 2 below. Report precise final results, which means that you
should use all decimals of your intermediate results to get your final answer. Round your
final answers to TWO decimal places.
Table 2 Individual Activity EU CE RP A
lvaro
1: Full time farming A
lvaro
2: Full time construction work A
lvaro
3: Part time farming Estela
1: Full time farming Estela
2: Full time construction work Estela
3: Part time farming 295 147.5
147.5
288 144
144
270
135
135
11.66
136.25
68.13
12
144
72
11.20
125.44
62.75
(c)
Which activity will be chosen by each individual?
If an individual is indifferent between two
activities (say A or B), write "Activity A OR Activity B"
Table 3 Individual Choice of Activity A
lvaro
Estela
(d) Which type of risk preferences describe each individual? (Risk Neutral, Risk Averse, or
Risk Loving?)
Table 4 Individual Risk Preferences A
lvaro
Estela
Question 2: Conventional Insurance Continue to use the same context from question 1, but now consider conventional insurance. Juana
is an insurance agent who offers conventional crop insurance contracts only to full time
farmers. She is not interested in offering insurance to part time farmers. The contracts are straightforward. At the beginning of the season, farmers pay a premium of $52.5
. At the end
of the season, Juana
pays farmers an indemnity payment of $150 if the farmer had a BAD harvest. If the farmer had a GOOD harvest, Juana
doesn’t pay the farmer anything. For parts a - d, assume the world is described by symmetric information.
In other words,
Juana
can wri
te
and enforce a contract that requires the farmer to choose full time farming. (a)
What is Juana
’s expected profit from this contract? (
Juana
’s profit is just the premium she
collects from the farmer minus the indemnity payment she makes to the farmer).
full time construction
risk loving
full time farming
risk averse
(b) What is the expected consumption for an individual who chooses full-time farming with
Juana
’s insurance contract
(Activity 4)?
(c)
What is the expected utility associated with full-time farming with an insurance contract
(Activity 4) for A
lvaro
and Estela
? Report TWO decimal places.
Table 5 (d) Now assume that each individual can choose between the four available activities: Full
Time Farming without Insurance (Activity 1 above), Full time construction work (Activity
2 above), Part Time Farming without insurance (Activity 3 above) and Full Time Farming
with Juana
’s insurance contract (Activity 4). Which activity will each individual choose?
If an individual is indifferent between two activities (say A or B), write "Activity A OR Activity B
Table 6 Individual Choice of Activity A
lvaro
Estela
Individual Expected Utility from Activity 4 A
lvaro
Estela
0
295
activity 1 OR activity 4
147.5
12.15
Activity 4
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UA = 10(100 – D)i + (100 – M),
%3D
Ug = 10(D)i + M,
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- 6) You have been assigned to create a new TV game show, and you have an interesting idea that you call, “I WANT TO BE A MILLIONAIRE.” The basics are: 1) two contestants; 2) the show begins with each contestant being given $1 million (!), and then 3) they begin playing a game that can increase or decrease that $1 million. You worry that the initial outlay of $2 million will stun your producers, so you decide to prepare them with a simpler version of your game that you call: “I WANT $3.” There are four steps in this simpler game: I. There are two contestants/opponents (who do not know each other and cannot communicate with each other during the game). II. Each player is given $3 at the start of the game. III. Independently and simultaneously, each player must choose whether they want to add $0, $1, $2 or $3 to their initial stake of $3. Doing so reduces their opponent’s award by $0, $2, $4, or $6, respectively. IV. Each player knows that their payoff at the end of the game is based on…arrow_forward6) You have been assigned to create a new TV game show, and you have an interesting idea that you call, “I WANT TO BE A MILLIONAIRE.” The basics are: 1) two contestants; 2) the show begins with each contestant being given $1 million (!); and then 3) they begin playing a game that can increase or decrease that $1 million. You worry that the initial outlay of $2 million will stun your producers, so you decide to prepare them with a simpler version of your game that you call: “I WANT $3.” There are four steps in this simpler game: There are two contestants/opponents (who do not know each other and cannot communicate with each other during the game). Each player is given $3 at the start of the game. Independently and simultaneously, each player must choose whether they want to add $0, $1, $2 or $3 to their initial stake of $3. Doing so reduces their opponent’s award by $0, $2, $4, or $6, respectively. Each player knows that their payoff at the end of the game is based on their initial…arrow_forwardKimberly's sister would like to start a business with her brother selling simple T-shirts that are green in color at all stores in the area. Her brother disagrees and thinks that the shirts should have a special logo on them and should be sold only at specific stores. As the deciding vote, what should Kimberly choose and why? Choose one: A selling green T-shirts because prices will be higher as the number of stores increases B. selling green T-shirts because prices will be higher as the shirt becomes more commonplace OC. selling shirts with a special logo because prices will be higher as the shirts becomes more unique OD. selling shirts with a special logo because prices will be higher as the shirts are sold in fewer stores OE. both C and Darrow_forward
- Problem 7 A casino offers people the chance to play the following game: flip two fair coins. If both come up heads, the gambler wins $1. If both come up tails, the gambler wins $3. If one is heads and one is tails, the gambler gets nothing. The game costs $1.25 to play. Your friend, Richard, who has not taken a probability course and thus doesn't know any better, goes to this casino and plays the game 600 times. Estimate the probability that your friend loses between $132 and $195 over the course of the 600 games. (You need to provide a number instead of an expression involving NA(a,b)).arrow_forwardQuestion-2 The Lahore Metro Bus is crowded for travel during peak hours. During such travel hours two daily passengers 'Ali' and 'Hassan' enter the Metro. Luckily, two adjacent seats are free in the bus. Each of them must decide whether to sit or stand. For both, sitting alone is more comfortable than sitting next to the other person, which in turn is more comfortable than standing. (Note: for parts (a) & (b) below consider Ali as 'row player' and Hassan as 'column player'). a) Model the situation as a strategic game, assuming both 'Ali' and 'Hassan' care only about their own comfort. Find the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) if it exists. Also, does a dominant strategy exist for either 'Ali' or 'Hassan'? b) Now assume that both 'Ali' and 'Hassan' are altruistic, ranking outcomes according to the other person's comfort and, out of politeness, prefer to stand than to sit if the other person stands. Model the situation as a strategic game and find any Nash equilibrium (equilibria) if it…arrow_forwardPublic Good Contribution: Three players live in a town, and each can choose to contribute to fund a streetlamp. The value of having the streetlamp is 3 for each player, and the value of not having it is 0. The mayor asks each player to contribute either 1 or nothing. Each player makes a decision without knowing others’ contributions. If at least two players contribute then the lamp will be erected. If one player or no players contribute then the lamp will not be erected, in which case any person who contributed will not get his money back. Write down the strategy sets of each player, their payoffs, and find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.arrow_forward
- Give typing answer with explanation and conclusionarrow_forwardTable 22-21 Three longtime friends-Linda, Stella, and Lydia are deciding how they will spend their Sunday afternoon. They all agree that they should do one of the three things: go to a comedy club, play soccer, or go to a tennis tournament. They also agree that they will have two pairwise votes to determine how to spend their afteroon, with the majority determining the outcome on each vote. The first, second, and third choices for each person are as indicated in the following table. First choice Second choice Third choice Linda tennis tournament soccer comedy club Stella soccer comedy club tennis tournament Lydia comedy club tennis tournament soccer Refer to Table 23-2. If (1) the first vote pits "tennis tournament" against "comedy club," and (2) the second vote pits "soccer against the winner of the first vote, then the outcome is as follows: ⒸA "Tennis tournament" wins the first vote and "tennis tournament" wins the second vote, so they go to a tennis tournament OB. "Tennis…arrow_forward2arrow_forward
- QUESTION 8 S1, S2, S3 and S4 are UIUC students who just graduated. They each have a poster of Dolly Parton that they are willing to sell. B1, 82, B3 and B4 are new students at UIUC and want to buy Dolly Parton postern for their rooms. The tables below give the minimum selling prices and maximum buying prices for each student. Minimum Selling Prices Maximum Buying Pricen X+$9 S1 $10 B1 S2 $11 B2 X+$14 S3 $20 B3 X+$16 S4 $25 B4 X+$26 If X is negative $5 (.e., Xu-$5), what is the market-clearing price? Note: Do not include the dollar sign,arrow_forwardTopic B Problem: Imagine you have two competing athletes who have the option to use an illegal and/or dangerous drug to enhance their performance (i.e., dope). If neither athlete dopes, then neither gains an advantage. If only one dopes, then that athlete gains a massive advantage over their competitor, reduced by the medical and legal risks of doping. However, if both athletes dope, the advantages cancel out, and only the risks remain, putting them both in a worse position than if neither had been doping. What class concept best describes this situation? Using this class concept, what outcome do we expect from these two athletes? Are there any factors that could change the outcome predicted by this course concept?arrow_forwardProblem: Imagine you have two competing athletes who have the option to use an illegal and dangerous drug to enhance their performance (i.e., dope). If neither athlete dopes, then neither gain an advantage. If only one dopes, then that athlete gains a massive advantage over their competitor, reduced by the medical and legal risks of doping (the athletes believe the advantage over their competitor outweighs the risks from doping ). However, if both athletes dope, the advantages cancel out, and only the risks remain, putting them both in a worse position than if neither had been doping. What outcome do we expect from these two athletes? Please use ideas like concepts of monopolies, Oligopolies and Game Theory and Factor markets for this scenario.arrow_forward
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