EXAM 2 SPRING 2021 SOLUTIONS without solutions for #5
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OTM 732: Economics for Managers EXAM 2 1) (20 points) This is the “Rational Pigs Game.” Two pigs, one big and the other small, are placed in a large box. There is a lever at one end of the box which, when pressed, dispenses food at the other end. This means that the pig that presses the lever must run to the other end to get any food; and by the time it gets there, the other pig will have eaten some, and perhaps all, of the food. The big pig can prevent the little pig from getting any of the food when both are at the food. If the pigs can reason like game theorists, which pig will press the lever? For concreteness, let’s attach some hypothetical numbers to the game. Suppose that 12 kernels of corn are dispensed if the lever is pressed (by either pig). If the small pig presses the lever, then the big pig eats all 12 kernels before the small pig can run to the other side of the box where the food appeared. However, if it was the big pig who pressed the lever, then the small pig has time to eat 10 of the 12 kernels before the big pig pushes it away and eats the remaining two kernels. Suppose that in the unlikely event that they press the lever together, the small pig, because it can run faster, gets 4 kernels before the big pig pushes it away. And once that happens, the big pig will eat the remaining 8 kernels. Finally, suppose that pressing the lever and running to the other end requires effort equal to one kernel of corn. This leads to the following game:
a)
(5 points) Does the SMALL pig have a strictly dominant strategy? If so, identify it. YES, “DON’T PRESS” is a SDS for the small pig b)
(5 points) Does the BIG pig have a strictly dominant strategy? If so, identify it. NO c)
(5 points) What is the Nash equilibrium to this game? Which pig does better in the NE? NE is (DON’T PRESS by Small, PRESS by Big) for a payoff of (10,1). The Small Pig does better! d)
(5 points) Is this game a Prisoner’s Dilemma game? Why or why not? No, this is not a PD because the Big Pig does not have a SDS….and there is not a non-equilibrium outcome that is strictly better for both of them.
***** This may seem like this is a silly game, but studies have shown that pigs can learn to behave in the ways described by this NE. 2) (20 points) You are playing a game with someone (not a friend and not someone you can communicate with). The game starts with both of you being awarded $3. The game’s rules are: • You announce whether you want to add $0, $1, $2 or $3 to your initial $3 award. Doing so reduces your opponent’s award by $0, $2, $4, or $6, respectively. (In words, they automatically lose twice what you gain.) • Your opponent simultaneously and independently has the same choices: add $0, $1, $2, or $3 to their initial $3 award, which automatically decreases your award by $0, $2, $4, or $6, respectively. Hi M So, for each of you, your final award equals: (your initial $3) + (your choice of $0, $1, $2, or $3) – 2 x (opponent’s choice of $0, $1, $2, or $3). If the game ends with a negative award for a player, that’s OK and you must pay that amount. a) (15 points) Create the game matrix for this game, showing players, actions, and payoffs. Identify the game’s Nash equilibrium strategies and payoffs for the players.
Each player (simultaneously and independently of the other) chooses to add to their award $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, ……$999,999, or $1,000,000. Doing so decreases the other player’s award by twice that amount. The game matrix for this expanded game has 1,000,001 rows and 1000,001 columns. DO NOT DRAW IT! But building on what you learned in part (a), answer the following two questions: i)
What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? ii)
What are the Nash equilibrium payoffs for the players in this game? 3)a) (10 points) A monopolist has the demand and MC (marginal cost) curves below. Assuming the monopolist must offer the same price to all potential buyers, draw the MR line, identify the profitmaximizing P* and Q*, shade the areas representing PS, CS, and any inefficiency. By calculating areas of triangles, report the numerical sizes of PS, CS, and any inefficiency
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1
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This question is about the game theory in economics. Please can anyone answer the following question step by step elaborately?
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Player 2
Left
P1: $40
Player 1
Up
P2: $0
P1: $44
Down
P2:$44
In the game shown above, list all of the EFFICIENT Nash Equilibrium (please check ALL that apply)
(up, left)
(up, right)
(down, left)
(down, right)
No efficient Nash Equilibrium
Right
P1:$1
P2: $1
P1: $0
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Can you help me with the question below?
What is [are] the Nash Equilibrium [Equilibria] of this game?
A) (10;10) and (20;20)
B) (30;30)
C) (10;20) and (20;10)
D) (20;20)
E) (30;30)
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Game theory problem
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Fool experts don't solve it I will dislike
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New answer needed in good format
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Question 1 (1 point)
In the following game, what is the Nash equilibrium? For each cell, the first number is the payoff for
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Firm A
High
Low
Firm B
High
Low
2,2
6,0
0,6
4, 4
Firm A chooses low; Firm B chooses high
Firm A chooses high; Firm B chooses high
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Firm A chooses high; Firm B chooses low
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2
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Player 1
оооо
Up
(up, left)
(up, right)
(down, left)
(down, right)
None
Down
Player 2
Left
P1: $15
P2: $15
In the game shown above, list all of the Nash Equilibrium (please check ALL that apply)
P1: $12
P2: $18
Right
P1:$11
P2: $16
P1: $13
P2: $13
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Warning ⚠️ I will give dislike if any small mistake found. So better solve otherwise dislike
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In the sequential production game shown below, the actions of four players are
required in order for a company's project to be successful (for example, each player
could be a different division or department with the company).
Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
Player 4
Act
Act
Act
Act
10
10
10
Quit
Quit
Quit
Quit
10
-X
-X
-X
-X
-X
-X
Suppose x = 5,000 (payoffs are -5,000). Suppose player 1 believes that Player 4 will
quit with probability p. How does this change the game?
%3D
O a) If 0 0.002, Player 1 will quit.
O c) If p > 0, Player 1 will quit
d) The value of p is irrelevant to Player 1
O o o o
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3
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2
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Problem #4: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Consider the following game, which has two states of nature shown in the two game tables
below:
"Harmful" (p = 1/3)
"Helpful" (1-p = 2/3)
Player 2
X Y
3, 2
Player 2
Y
2, 3
3, 2
1,0
0,1
A
0,1
3,2
A
Player 1
Player 1
В
0,1
B
a) Assume that Player 1 knows what the true state of nature is when playing this game, but
Player 2 does not. Find all of the game's Bayesian Nash equilibria. (Hint: It may help to
arrange the game tables appropriately.)
b) Now, assume that Player 2 knows the true state of nature, but Player 1 does not. Find all
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Once the croupier releases the ball, your friend panics; it turns out that the $361 he bet was literally all the
money he has. While he is risk-averse - his utility function is u(x) =, where x is his roulette payoff - you are
effectively risk neutral over such small stakes.
a. When the ball is still spinning, what is the expected profit for the casino?
b. When the ball is still spinning, what is the expected value of your friend's wealth?
c. When the ball is still spinning, what is your friend's certainty equivalent (i.e., how much money would he
accept with certainty to walk away from his bet).
Say you propose the following…
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7
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Player 2
Middle
Left
P1: $45
P1: $70
Up
P2: $45
P2: $50
Player 1
P1: $50
P1: $60
Middle
P2: $50
P2: $60
P1: $60
P1: $50
Down
P2: $60
P2: $70
In the game shown above, list all of the Nash Equilibrium (please check ALL that apply)
(up, left)
(up, middle)
(up, right)
(middle, left)
(middle, middle)
(middle, right)
(down, left)
(down, middle)
(down, right)
No equilibrium
Right
P1: $45
P2: $60
P1: $50
P2: $70
P1: $60
P2: $60
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M11
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7
In bargaining theory, sometimes an individual’s patience level can affect his or her bargaining power. Consider a simple repeated game in which Person 1 makes an offer to purchase a good that Person 2 is selling; Person 2 can either accept this offer or reject it and make a counteroffer. This game continues until one player accepts the other’s offer. Explain how incorporating the rate of time preference (ββ) into such a repeated game might alter the outcome.
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6
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Game Theory Question
A non-profit firm is on a local community online donation platform for a community event it wants to hold (only community members can donate via the website). The event will be held only if the non-profit firm collects $20,000 total from members of the community. Each member values the event at $500. Suppose that there are 100 community members. Community members can only donate by purchasing a lottery ticket from the firm. Each ticket costs $200 and only one ticket can be purchased per member. The proceeds will be collected by the firm. The lottery winner gets a premier meal at a local restaurant that's worth $100.
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Player 2
Left
Right
P1: $4
Player 1
Up
P2: $1
P1: $10
Down
P2:s10
Which of the Nash Equilibrium to this game are efficient? [Check all that apply]
A) (up, left)
B) (down, left)
C
None are efficient
(D) (up right)
E
(down, right)
Last saved 4:31:15 PM
P1:S1
P2: $6
P1: $0
P2: $11
Grading
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4.2.
Game theory (Prisoner's dilemma). Often, many sectors in an economy have two main
rivals, battling it out in the marketplace. There can be rivalry such as between Apple and
Samsung in Phones and Laptops. Suppose Apple plans to cut its price. Samsung will likely
follow suit to retain its market share. This may end up with low profits for both companies. A
price drop by either company may thus be construed as defecting since it breaks an implicit
agreement to keep prices high and maximize profits. Thus, if Apple drops its price but
Samsung continues to keep prices high, Apple is defecting, while Samsung is cooperating (by
sticking to the spirit of the implicit agreement). In this scenario, Apple may win market share
and earn incremental profits by selling more.
Assume that the incremental profits that accrue to Apple and Samsung are as follows:
If both keep prices high (Cooperate), profits for each company increase by AED200 million
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Up
P2 gets $150
...
Up
P1 gets $100
Down
P2 gets $100
Up
P1 gets $95
Down
P2 gets $95
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Down
P2 gets $25
Player 1
Player 2
In the game above, what is/are the EFFICIENT sub-game
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A (down, up)
B NO EFFICIENT equilibrium exists
C (up,down)
D (down, down)
E) (up,up)
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O (up, left)
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☐ (down, left)
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(down, right)
None
Down
Player 2
Left
P1: $8
P2: $7
P1: $6
P2:$4
Right
P1:$14
P2: $9
P1: $15
P2: $3
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