ECON 138 Quiz Question Bank w_o answers

3   Imagine that the wage-schooling locus is given by w(s)=s^(1/3). What will be the optimal level of education for an individual to take if next period’s earnings in any given time are worth 95% of current earnings for that individual? ---- HINT: the answer is s=20/57.   I need step by step solution

Economics Slade and Meredith had each been earning $600 per week before losing their jobs at Nardel Solutions. Slade and Meredith live in states with replacement ratios of 1:3 (i.e., 33.33%), but Meredith's state caps unemployment compensation at $100 per week. The table below represents their marginal benefit and marginal cost of search assuming no unemployment compensation. Reservation Wage Marginal Benefit ($/week) Marginal Cost 100 700 500 150 600 450 200 500 400 250 400 350 300 300 300 350 200 250 400 100 200 With unemployment compensation, what is Slade's optimal reservation wage? O $600 per week O $300 per week O $250 per week O $500 per week

Suppose Fred's wage-schooling relationship is given by Years of Schooling Earnings 9 $28,000 10 $31,150 11 $33,700 12 $35,900 13 $37,400 14 $38,500 Derive the marginal rate of return schedule. When will Fred quit school if his discount rate is 5 percent? What if the discount rate is 10 percent?

16) If labour market discrimination crowds women into a limited number ofoccupations so that the number of occupations available to men increases, then(a) the wages of men will be lower, but the marginal productivity of men will be higherthan it otherwise would be.(b) both the wages and the marginal productivity of men will be higher than theyotherwise would be.(c) both the wages and the marginal productivity of men will be lower than theyotherwise would be.(d) wages of men will be higher, but the marginal productivity of men will be lowerthan it otherwise would be.

-1 0:30:18 Incomes for adults vary widely across race and gender in the United States. These differences can be due to all of the following except. Multiple Choice choice of occupation. discrimination. education. inherent ability.

Assume that the current disability benefit for individuals with disabilities that prevent them from working full time, is X kroner per day. The disability benefit goes to zero if a worker accepts a job for even one hour per week. Suppose that the benefit rules are changed so those disabled workers who take jobs that pay less than X kroner per day receive a benefit that brings their total daily income (wage plus the benefit) up to X kroner. When labor market earnings of a disabled individual rises above X kroner per day, their disability benefits end. Draw the old and the new budget constraints (label each clearly) associated with the disability benefit program, and analyze the work incentive effects of the change in benefits

Domestic low-skilled workers each work 1,920 hours a year on average, and they receive $8 per hour. Suppose that, statistically, for each 10 % rise in the number c employed immigrants in low-skilled jobs, the annual number of hours worked by domestic low-skilled workers falls by 3%. At the same time, their wage declines by 1%. There are 300,000 Immigrants working in low-skilled jobs, and 120,000 more are about to come, all of whom will also find low-skilled jobs. Calculate the drop in annual income of an average domestic worker in dollars. Enter your answer as a positive number in the box below and round to two decimak places if necessary. Round your intermediate calculations to two decimal places.

(6) What does efficiency-wage theory suggest as an alternative to this decision of wage and/or headcount reduction?

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Suppose Carl’s wage-schooling locus is given by Years of Schooling Earnings 10 $30,000 11 $35,000 12 $40,000 13 $45,000 14 $50,000 15 $55,000 16 $60,000 17 $65,000   Derive the marginal rate of return schedule. When will Carl quit school if his discount rate is 14 percent? What if the discount rate is 9 percent?

Question 2. (Child Labor). Take the unisex model of fertility where a parent has tastes of the form Inc+(1-0) Inn. Here c is their consumption and n is the number of children that they have. Suppose that a parent earns the wage w and has one unit of time to split between working and rearing children. Each child costs y units of time to raise. A child has one unit of time and can earn the wage rate v 1, as it would have been historically. How does this effect the number of children, n? Discuss the economics underlying your result. (Hint: Note that da/dxalna.) 5. Why do you need to substitute the solution for v into the first-order condition after you solve the parent's problem? 6. Discuss the import of this question.

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Let us consider Amanda can work a maximum of 60 hours per week, at a wage rate of $5 per hour. Welfare benefits are fixed at $200 per week, with a 100 percent tax back on labour earnings. Finally, the earnings supplement equals half the difference between an individual’s labour earnings and the benchmark earnings of $450 per week. This supplement can be collected only if the individual forgoes welfare benefits and works a minimum of 30 hours per week. Draw Amanda's budget constraint, and analyze the work decision. (Make sure to graph)

Conceptual (Basic, [5]) Consider our final lecture on human capital, economic growth and wealth inequality. We showed that the variance in the distribution of the logarithm of human capital is

3. The value of a worker's marginal product is $40 per hour for high-ability workers and $10 per hour for low-ability workers. Each worker cares about the wage (w) and amount of education (e) he or she obtains. Preferences over education- wage pairs (e, w) of high-ability workers are representable by utility function un(e, w) = w - 5e, and low-ability workers by utility function u(e, w) = w – 10e. By law, everyone is required to attend at least 10 years of school. One-third of the population has low ability and two-thirds has high ability. Reservation wage for each type is zero. What can you say about the educational attainment of each type of the worker in a separating equilibrium? Show your work. a) b) What can you say about the educational attainment of each type of the worker in a pooling equilibrium? Show your work.

Assume we are investigating gender differences in labor market outcomes and we are analyzing employee discrimination. When discussing employee discrimination, the typical assumption is that two groups of workers are perfect substitutes. Some research, however, suggests that worker productivity rises when the diversity of the workforce in a firm increases. This implies that the marginal productivity of male workers increases as more female workers are hired. If employee discrimination occurs against women, under what conditions will a gender-segregated workforce exist? Will a wage gap between men and women exist? Explain your answer.

Please write a different answer there is an answer available for this on Bartleby already and tutors are copying and pasting that answer. but I need a new working from you     1. Consider an individual aged 64 who is eligible to collect full social security (public pension) benefits of $6,000 for a year. They have no other income but can work at a weekly wage rate of $600 for a maximum of 52 weeks. Receipt of benefits from the social security program is retirement tested. Specifically, the individual can earn up to $9,000 in annual wage income without a reduction in benefits; however, after $9,000 of earnings, benefits are reduced by 50% for every dollar earned, until the benefits are exhausted. a) Carefully draw and label the budget constraint for this individual.  b) Suppose previously there was a retirement test, and then the test is eliminated, i.e., the individual now is allowed to keep all benefits, irrespective of their labour earnings. How would this affect the individual's…

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The answer is s = 20/57 I need step by step calculation