mid2

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Economics

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Apr 3, 2024

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Second Midterm You have 50 minutes to answer 32 questions. Good luck! 1. Subjective evaluation of probabilities can exhibit (A) the law of small numbers; (B) selfishness; (C) altruism; (D) all of the above. Answer: A 2. Confirmation bias can explain (A) overconfidence; (B) ambiguity aversion; (C) risk aversion; (D) all of the above. Answer: A 3. Consider a game with two players (Alice and Bob) and payoffs Bob Bob s 1 s 2 Alice,s 1 1 , 1 0 , 0 Alice,s 2 0 , 0 1 , 1 This game has (A) a dominant strategy equilibrium; (B) an iterated dominant strategy equilibrium; (C) two Nash equilibria in pure strategies; (D) none of the above. Answer: C 4. Behavioral evidence suggests that the two agents are most likely to coordinate on the strategy s 1 if (A) Alice can announce her plans prior to playing the game; (B) Alice and Bob randomize and play both strategies with equal probabilities; (C) both Alice and Bob can make such announcements; (D) none of them can announce anything prior to playing the game. Answer: A or C 5. Which of the following games have equilibria in dominant strategies? (A) coordination games; (B) first-price auctions; (C) beauty contest games; (D) none of the above. Answer: D 6. Spiteful behaviors are often observed in (A) centipede games; (B) beauty contest games; (C) ultimatum bargaining games; (D) all of the above. Answer: C 7. Behavioral data suggests that the subjects can do better (get higher payoffs) than the theoretical equilibria predict in (A) centipede games; (B) coordination games with cheap talk; (C) stag-hunt games with cheap talk; (D) all of the above. Answer: D
8. The ultimatum bargaining game has an equilibrium where the dictator offers 0 (or the smallest mone- tary unit) to the recipient, and the recipient accepts. This equilibrium assumes (A) selfishness and backward induction; (B) altruism and backward induction; (C) altruism and spite; (D) randomization and spite. Answer: A 9. Consider a public-good game where each of 8 players has a 10 endowment and their contributions to the “public good” are multiplied by a factor of 5 and then shared equally. Then it is a dominant strategy to share (A) 0; (B) 1; (C) 9; (D) 10. Answer: A 10. Your answer in the previous question assumes that (A) all subjects maximize expected utility; (B) all subjects are altruistic; (C) all subjects are selfish; (D) all of the above. Answer: C 11. Consider three bidders who have private values that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 100. Suppose that these values happen to be v 1 = 12, v 2 = 60, and v 3 = 34. Then the equilibrium price in the second-price auction is (A) 12; (B) 60; (C) 34; (D) 40. Answer: C 12. (continued) The equilibrium price in the first-price auction is (A) 12; (B) 60; (C) 34; (D) 40. Answer: D 13. (continued) The equilibrium price in the English auction is (A) 12; (B) 60; (C) 34; (D) 40. Answer: C 14. (continued) The equilibrium price in the Dutch auction is (A) 12; (B) 60; (C) 34; (D) 40. Answer: D 15. The equilibria in these auctions (A) are all in dominant strategies; (B) exhibit Winner’s Curse; (C) on average, second-price auction generates higher equilibrium prices than the first-price; (D) none of the above. Answer: D 16. The overbidding in exotic auctions is best explained by (A) altruism; (B) sunk-cost fallacy and failures to randomize the bidding strategies; (C) selfishness; (D) risk aversion. Answer: B 17. In experiments, the theoretical prediction for the equilibrium price is most likely to hold for (A) the Dutch auction; (B) the English auction; (C) the second-price auction; (D) the first-price auction. Answer: B 18. In experiments with randomly assigned private values, the lowest average revenue among the four basic auction types (Dutch, English, first-price, second-price) is typically generated by (A) first-price; (B) second-price; (C) English; (D) Dutch. Answer: C
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