Ltc Role Model

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) can be more affected by redundancy in combat zones when more than one tactical element working in the same area of operation. “reduce redundancy of effort, and take advantage of positive relations that are built by the secondary HUMINT collectors. It is important to note as each secondary HUMINT asset is examined that some have a secondary mission to collect intelligence.” (Wright, David N 2003). These different echelons working in the same area will collect information about cases and report it to the chain of command, it will process to intelligence. In the operational level, when all these reports gathered and summed together, it will create redundancy, and can be work positively to confirm the data and validate the source or the case. In the other hand, it can be represented a wasting of man power and trained collectors all summing their efforts to the same case or source. These situations created due to tracking of tracking system or a structural issue in the organizations. The structural reformation in the intelligence agency or element it will take a long process, from studying, training, funding, set up communication channels, recognize the rule of the new structure in the process of collecting intelligence, and places its proper spot in the intelligence cycle to agile the whole process. Also, to have a better product than before, less redundant,

Performed duties of an SGL assigned to the Basic Leader Course (BLC) for the Fires Center of Excellence (FCOE). Served as the subject matter expert for all Course Management Plan (CMP) and Programs of Instruction (POI,) training and maintaining instructor certification. Responsible for the wellbeing, safety, professional development, and training of 16 Soldiers on a 22-day recurring cycle, performing nine cycles a year. During my tenure as a BLC SGL, I achieved numerous accomplishments and achievements. Received enormous praise from the United States Sergeants Major Academy (USAMA) for renovation of a Training Support Package (TSP) that was implemented across BLCs for the entire Army. Hand-picked as NCO of the Month for September 2015, selected

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

In February 2002, Special Forces intelligence agents along with Advanced Force Operations (AFO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were starting to make a connection between an increase presence of high-value targets (HVT), the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters in an area called Shahi-Kot Valley (Neville, 2005). Shahi-Kot is located in Afghanistan, just southeast of a town called Zormat. A plan was devised to eliminate the enemy threat in that area. Major Franklin L. Hagenbeck was to command the mission called Operation Anaconda. This operation was the first large-scale battle in the United States War in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora (Call, 2007, p. 57-86). Operation Anaconda was also unique in the fact that it would involve a great number of Afghan militia, U.S. and coalition Special Operations, and conventional forces (U.S. Army, n.d.),

The 120th Engineer Battalion consists of 8 companies with an assigned strength of 725 Soldiers. He currently oversees more than 20 active construction and improvement projects at Camp Gruber, Broken Arrow and Muskogee Armed Forces Reserve Centers and throughout the State of Oklahoma. LTC Ostervold’s leadership and dedication is unwavering. He personally developed and mentored subordinates within his span of control to improve on all soldier and engineering requirements. During his short time as the Battalion Commander, LTC Ostervold has been able to increase the retention of quality engineer soldiers through realistic and meaningful Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training. LTC Ostervold has increased the overall strength of the Battalion by over 6% (42 Soldiers) by aggressively recruiting Soldiers that have a passion to serve their country in the Oklahoma National Guard and learn a valuable skill set as an Army

SGT Davis’s ability to adapt to different situations was showcased during the Units Joint Mission Readiness Center rotation. SGT Davis created an in depth link diagrams depicting organized crime groups, current slants, and specific roles in multiple municipalities using open sources tactics resulting in a refined product; defining his outstanding proficiency with limited assets, nevertheless exceeding expectations.

CW3 Smith was responsible for the fielding CGSS-A throughout the entire CENTCOM theater serving the all three Army Compo, strategic agencies and contractors. She was responsible for the management of 800-850 DODDACs from the initial request, alignment, funding, activation and execution. Ultimately, she resolved over 1000-1200 work orders weekly. She sent countless man-hours resolving matters for ASG, 1TSC, CJTF and tenant organizations to ensure forward forces where efficiently equipped in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The intelligence community has been able to adapt to working in a more intergraded fashion with Special Forces operators to deliver intelligence to the operators that are in the field. The intelligence community’s development of analysis and intelligence, allowed for the capture or elimination of known bad actors (most of the major Al-Qaeda leadership targets) to include Osama Bin Laden.

There were many faults in US intelligence during Persian Gulf War I (Gulf War I) that carried over to the Persian Gulf War II (Gulf War II). A lack of a doctrinal foundation and existing structure by the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) when aiding the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in Gulf War I severely hindered the ground operations during this war. Similarly in Gulf War II the army doctrine attempted to provide “a baseline for helping the commander visualise the information environment.” A plan to influence the information is then relayed to subordinates. This failed to prepare commanders to integrate IO (information operations) into their operations by repeating the same mistakes in Gulf War I. These faults

1. Over the past 4 months, BG Roshangar has aggressively contributed to the 201st Corps Regional Operations Coordination Center mission. He hit the ground running and dove right into his responsibilities as a trusted and valued leader to the 201st command and coalition advisors. BG Roshangar built trust with his coalition advisors through having a positive approach to daily operations. He conducted daily updates with coalition advisors to improve the operations and intelligence communicates flow throughout 201st Corps and seven Provincial Operations Coordination Centers. He also worked closely with the Embedded Police Advisors and Intelligence advisors to receive, distribute, and analyze information improving reporting procedures.

From June 2012 to April 2017, he served as Production Manager for the 2500th Military Intelligence Group providing the critical

Ideas of how we could be smart on performing this challenge came out like a flood because the airmen of this team knew the importance of the mission. In the end, we were able to extract two combined-joint task informers from behind enemy lines that provided information needed back to our primary mission in Jordan. When the mission was deemed a success, I praised the team for all their accomplishments and they later informed me that they never felt so committed and valued to a task before in their

The purpose of this blog is to identify the most difficult part of the targeting cycle in the Army targeting framework of the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate (F3EAD) targeting cycle and to explain why. In my opinion, the most difficult aspect of the F3EAD targeting cycle varies IAW correlating efforts of military intelligence and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process contributions.

For the role model interview project, I chose to interview one of my closest friends, Erin. I decided to interview her because in addition to looking up to her, I felt comfortable talking to her and I knew that she would answer these questions honestly and openly. The interview took place through video chat simply because we could not go over to each other’s houses and I didn’t think asking these private questions in a public place such as school would not be appropriate. We talked to each other after school so that we would have plenty of time to get through all the questions without having some sort of limit. While she was the person I chose as my role model, she had chosen her dad as her own role model. A role model is hardworking, empowering, and selfless.