Partnerships were not just joint but a better relationship between the Operational units under INSCOM and the proponent for intelligence under Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). These formed a strong bond that allowed current education, training, and mission success to shape the Army’s next steps. The relationship between TRADOC and the Operational frontend is absolutely vital to the success of training and education. Too often TRADOC would lag behind or operations would not communicate the changing demands, thus hindering the advance of military intelligence occupational
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) can be more affected by redundancy in combat zones when more than one tactical element working in the same area of operation. “reduce redundancy of effort, and take advantage of positive relations that are built by the secondary HUMINT collectors. It is important to note as each secondary HUMINT asset is examined that some have a secondary mission to collect intelligence.” (Wright, David N 2003). These different echelons working in the same area will collect information about cases and report it to the chain of command, it will process to intelligence. In the operational level, when all these reports gathered and summed together, it will create redundancy, and can be work positively to confirm the data and validate the source or the case. In the other hand, it can be represented a wasting of man power and trained collectors all summing their efforts to the same case or source. These situations created due to tracking of tracking system or a structural issue in the organizations. The structural reformation in the intelligence agency or element it will take a long process, from studying, training, funding, set up communication channels, recognize the rule of the new structure in the process of collecting intelligence, and places its proper spot in the intelligence cycle to agile the whole process. Also, to have a better product than before, less redundant,
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
Performed duties of an SGL assigned to the Basic Leader Course (BLC) for the Fires Center of Excellence (FCOE). Served as the subject matter expert for all Course Management Plan (CMP) and Programs of Instruction (POI,) training and maintaining instructor certification. Responsible for the wellbeing, safety, professional development, and training of 16 Soldiers on a 22-day recurring cycle, performing nine cycles a year. During my tenure as a BLC SGL, I achieved numerous accomplishments and achievements. Received enormous praise from the United States Sergeants Major Academy (USAMA) for renovation of a Training Support Package (TSP) that was implemented across BLCs for the entire Army. Hand-picked as NCO of the Month for September 2015, selected
During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.
The 120th Engineer Battalion consists of 8 companies with an assigned strength of 725 Soldiers. He currently oversees more than 20 active construction and improvement projects at Camp Gruber, Broken Arrow and Muskogee Armed Forces Reserve Centers and throughout the State of Oklahoma. LTC Ostervold’s leadership and dedication is unwavering. He personally developed and mentored subordinates within his span of control to improve on all soldier and engineering requirements. During his short time as the Battalion Commander, LTC Ostervold has been able to increase the retention of quality engineer soldiers through realistic and meaningful Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training. LTC Ostervold has increased the overall strength of the Battalion by over 6% (42 Soldiers) by aggressively recruiting Soldiers that have a passion to serve their country in the Oklahoma National Guard and learn a valuable skill set as an Army
SGT Davis’s ability to adapt to different situations was showcased during the Units Joint Mission Readiness Center rotation. SGT Davis created an in depth link diagrams depicting organized crime groups, current slants, and specific roles in multiple municipalities using open sources tactics resulting in a refined product; defining his outstanding proficiency with limited assets, nevertheless exceeding expectations.
Case management services were provided through an FTM (family team meting) in the youth’s home. Present at the meeting were WYP (Wraparound Youth Partner) Andy Ngo, WYP Vicky Tran, WPP (Wraparound Parent Partner) Shannon Ortiz, WCC (Wraparound care Coordinator) Jody Taylor, SSW (Social Services Worker) Stacey Padilla, the youth’s grandfather, the siblings, and the youth. The team went around sharing about the successes and the positives (what is working well), The youth is getting tutoring at school and in the home. The kids are doing their chores. The sisters look up to the youth as a role model. The youth does not have any behavior issue with WYP Ngo. The grandfather was at court on October 12th, 2016 to adopt the kids. The next court date
CW3 Smith was responsible for the fielding CGSS-A throughout the entire CENTCOM theater serving the all three Army Compo, strategic agencies and contractors. She was responsible for the management of 800-850 DODDACs from the initial request, alignment, funding, activation and execution. Ultimately, she resolved over 1000-1200 work orders weekly. She sent countless man-hours resolving matters for ASG, 1TSC, CJTF and tenant organizations to ensure forward forces where efficiently equipped in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The intelligence community has been able to adapt to working in a more intergraded fashion with Special Forces operators to deliver intelligence to the operators that are in the field. The intelligence community’s development of analysis and intelligence, allowed for the capture or elimination of known bad actors (most of the major Al-Qaeda leadership targets) to include Osama Bin Laden.
1. Over the past 4 months, BG Roshangar has aggressively contributed to the 201st Corps Regional Operations Coordination Center mission. He hit the ground running and dove right into his responsibilities as a trusted and valued leader to the 201st command and coalition advisors. BG Roshangar built trust with his coalition advisors through having a positive approach to daily operations. He conducted daily updates with coalition advisors to improve the operations and intelligence communicates flow throughout 201st Corps and seven Provincial Operations Coordination Centers. He also worked closely with the Embedded Police Advisors and Intelligence advisors to receive, distribute, and analyze information improving reporting procedures.
Important battles in a war are the ones that not only define the campaign but also the men who take part in them. An important battle often shapes the conditions for the rest of the war and enables future success. The purpose of this paper is to provide a thorough battle analysis of Operation Anaconda by reviewing the setting, describing the actions of friendly and enemy forces, and then assessing the significance of those actions. Additionally, this paper will identify an alternate ending based on the use of available intelligence assets. Had military intelligence effectively employed measures and signatures intelligence assets and correctly analyzed the information those assets provided before the start of Operation Anaconda, estimates of enemy composition, disposition, capabilities, and intentions would have been known and could have drastically reduced the amount of casualties Coalition Forces incurred. Second and third order effects of realizing this intelligence would have shattered the enemy’s ability to conduct major combat operations and set the conditions for stability operations to take place.
Ideas of how we could be smart on performing this challenge came out like a flood because the airmen of this team knew the importance of the mission. In the end, we were able to extract two combined-joint task informers from behind enemy lines that provided information needed back to our primary mission in Jordan. When the mission was deemed a success, I praised the team for all their accomplishments and they later informed me that they never felt so committed and valued to a task before in their
It is October 2005 as everyone joins the rest of the Company in northern Minnesota for one last get together with friends and family at a nice hotel. Everyone is eating their last, good, American meal before they are restricted to Army chow and MRE’s. The thought of being a parent at such a young age will scare anyone, even more so when the lifestyle chosen has been already non-conducive to being an active role model and a key player in the development of that child. No way could I have been ready for this responsibility with the cards already stacked against me. You leave for training the same day you find out you are going to be a parent, but after you leave the comfort of that special person in your life whom you are about to communicate with through chats and email for all but two weeks out of the next 18 months.
Intelligence played a vital role in the capturing of the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein. The Intelligence Community, together with Special Operations Forces (SOF), gathered adequate and accurate human intelligence (HUMINT) that helped in the identification of Saddam Hussein’s location. According to senior U.S. officials, HUMINT, rather than other kinds of information produced by technical means, led the U.S. to Saddam.