To understand the shift in military knowledge requirements, as an element of military intelligence, it is necessary to examine the evolution of employment of intelligence to support military operations. The shift in the use and value of knowledge in the military domain parallels the evolution of knowledge as a commodity within Western society. This issue is quantified in valuation, where in the private sector knowledge has become a key asset for the world’s major corporations. The value of knowledge assets in multi-national companies like Google has outstripped the tangible assets of companies like U.S. Steel. As intelligence became more accessible via networks, the demands for tailored information to support knowledge creation at lower tactical levels grew. Therefore, the demand for tactical intelligence centers was developed. Yet, the foundation information requirements that commanders and intelligence professionals process to build intelligence have not changed. The requirements for additional processing and the demand for predictive intelligence was likely premature - the intelligence community receiving pressure based on theoretical concepts of knowledge developed in the 1970s. Then in 2001, the National Intelligence Enterprise was leveraged for support to tactical operations during the war in Afghanistan. This in turn led to a demand for national intelligence inputs at all tactical level. The requirements for intelligence have not changed despite changes in
Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.
Under the Reagan Doctrine, the CIA trained and helped the Contras, an anti-communist guerrilla force in Nicaragua, who were battling against the Sandinistas. The Boland Amendment was passed in which the Department of Defense and the CIA were restricted from operating in Nicaragua. . McFarlane believed the sale of arms would enhance relations between the U.S. and Iran, and increase the influence of the U.S. in the Middle East, in especial Lebanon. Reagan was driven by seven Americans who were being held hostages by terrorists in Lebanon. They proceeded to ship arms to Iran, a violation of the embargo. This came to be know as the “arms-for-hostages deal”. The money was used to finance the Contras in their battle against the Sandinistas. When
Production of intelligence has change drastically since the Cold War. During the Cold War, the main intelligence gathering methods were mainly organized on the collection side, using SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT. Today we face a new enemy, where we must change our typical intelligence gathering methods. As we changed our methods,
The espionage of the United States’ government is a controversial issue these days. Espionage is the gathering of information without the permission or warrant of the holder of the information. Within the rapid technological development, the variety of tools for espionage are available in the United States; it can be obtained by tracking, surveillance, wiretapping, etc. Specifically, Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking system is one of the significant topics for espionage. Recently, many people including drivers, hikers, and manufacturers often use GPS to see the directions to their destinations, to locate themselves one a trail map, or to keep track of their delivering products. However, today’s controversy with GPS device is that police also uses it to determine suspects’ locations and movements. It is the most advanced technological device to effectively track and monitor suspects and offenders using satellites. Therefore, some people argue that the use of GPS tracking should be increased and should not need warrants, while others assert that GPS devices to track suspects raise legal problems, so Supreme Court should limits police use of GPS tracking. There are many positive and negative aspects of it. According to the article “Do Police Need Warrants For GPS Tracking Devices?,” the author says that the reason for controversy of GPS tracking devices is that “Police, quite naturally, want to use new technology to get the goods on the bad guys, and citizens, quite
The intent of terrorist is to inflict as much harm and damage as possible. More than likely they will target areas with large population and areas with weak security. If successful, not only will the attack cause death and injury, the attack will also affect survivors psychological and cause damage to the economy. The weapon of choice from terrorists ranges from assault rifles to bombs. Any type of weapon used correctly can bring injury and/or death.
Today's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is centered on the same basic principles as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the 1940's but with some significant changes, specifically in its organization and methods. The OSS, the world's first global intelligence organization, was organized and overseen by "Wild Bill Donovan" and expanded at an unprecedented pace throughout World War II. The OSS was the foundation for today's CIA. It was because of the successes and failures of the OSS that the CIA has been able to grow and develop.
The nature of terrorist threat combined with technologies that facilitate globalization resulted in both the necessity as well as the capacity to wage war and conduct intelligence operations in a new
A great emphasis has been placed on transforming the Intelligence Community (IC) since the catastrophic events of September 2001, as the tragedy highlighted the requirement for the collective organizations to transform in the face of emerging threats and to support new security agencies. A range of instruments such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the 9/11 Commission Report and multiple Executive Orders, directed the IC to become more collaborative. However, any organizational change has issues and the IC is no different in this respect. Two specific factors are key to successful intelligence collaboration. Firstly, the method in which information is shared across the community is of vital importance because each organization relies on discoverable and accessible information to complete their roles in national security. Secondly, relationships between agencies need to be nurtured to foster a cooperative rather than competitive environment because the information flow is promoted within an organization that is not restricted by vertical integration—that is, information can flow across departments at various levels rather than be
The United States has focused on developing better methods and capabilities to obtain intelligence since the revolutionary war. Arguably, the most significant advances in intelligence collection capabilities have developed since the digital era and have matured through asymmetric warfare during the Global War on Terrorism. For the past thirteen years, the United States has continued to grow technical intelligence capabilities to understand and develop the military battlefield environment. With this growing, need for technical intelligence the United States’ non-technical intelligence methodologies have gradually atrophied and reduced the nation’s military ability to obtain a comprehensive intelligence picture. Through examples in Iraq, Afghanistan, and African countries, we can illustrate adversaries’ abilities in an asymmetric environment to overcome technical intelligence requiring the nation to retrain and perfect non-technical intelligence capabilities. With a constantly evolving battlefield, the future success of the nation requires a blended approach of collecting and disseminating intelligence utilizing technical and non-technical capabilities equally to enable predictive deployment of military power against unseen threats in future operating environments.
For My February FVR I read a book named N.E.R.D.S which stands for National Espionage, Rescue, and Defense Society. The main character of this story is Jackson Jones. He is the most popular kid in his school. He is also very mean to a lot of the kids at his school.
For example, during the Cold War and the time before that, human intelligence (HUMINT) played a significant role in intelligence collections. After the Cold War, in the intelligence world, TECHINT gained more popularity over HUMINT. For example, in the 1990s, U.S. government cut budget on HUMINT. After this, human intelligence went through a major period of retraction and reconstruction. Lack of funding in human authority in the intelligence community put HUMINT in a dark phase after the Cold War. Thus, the size of HUMINT shrank in the U.S. intelligence community. With the starting of the Desert Storm in 1990, this changed many things in the U.S. intelligence community. Many important operations took place after that, such as military operations in Somalia and Kosovo. In all those operations, technology became vital and played key roles over human intelligence. With the introduction of the internet in the 1990s, technology changed the landscape of the intelligence world. After 9/11, more than HUMINT, intelligence analysts and operators brought GEOINT and SIGINT to their laptops to collect intelligence in remote areas and far away from home. Nowadays, more than HUMINT, we can see UAVs (Unmanned Aerial vehicles) loitering over targets for hours and them sending intelligence signals and full motion videos to the U.S. Intelligence communities. Intelligence analysts, more than HUMINT (nowadays), use numerous sophisticated database systems and GEOINT to build all source fusion products. With America taking part in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (largely pushed by the U.S. intelligence communities), in the modern day intelligence world, this thing pushed technology/TECHINT in a completely new level in gathering enemy intelligence and carrying out espionage against them. (Pamerleau,
In response to an increase in overt and clandestine acts by terrorist groups, transnational ideological movements and other nations, governments around the world have moved more resources into gathering intelligence to protect its people and national interests. As a result, the contribution of Intelligence Analysts in matters of national security have increased considerably in recent years. To be effective an Intelligence Analyst is required to be adept at evaluating different types of intelligence data, liaising with other departments and organisations effectively and remaining objective in scrutinising collected information. Intelligence comes in many formats, and a good understanding of these various formats and the process by which they
Intelligence products or also referred as “Finished intelligence” are very important because U.S. Government Officials and decision makers such as the President, policymakers, agencies’ directors, and senior military officers among others, make their decisions based on the findings and analysis that are provided through the intelligence products (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). The decisions of U.S. Government Officials are very important because they can have a major impact on many people and they can also place peoples’ lives at risk if the decisions are not carefully made. Therefore, the USIC must take into consideration many different factors and utilize different types of sources when they develop their intelligence products so that their products can reveal the information and analysis that their customers need to know in order to make wise decisions (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).
The government is not always required to have a warrant in a search and seizure of a house or a person’s possession. Intelligence Agencies can hack peoples' cell phones and listen and track phone calls, without a warrant. (Source 6). Intelligent Agencies have the ability to do this without a warrant as long as the phone call or text messages go back to the federal court (source 6). With the 4th Amendment supposed to protect your private property, the government can somehow access a citizens past vacation, phone calls, and many more without your consent (source 1). The government in this case will not require your permission or a warrant, this leads to the government collecting data on people. Many government agents who are assigned a person
OSINT is not a new concept. Rathmell and Valeri state that Intelligence Agencies have always used foreign newspapers, academic consultants and debriefings from international travellers. According to Hulnick, OSINT makes up 70-80% or more of the United States Intelligence Database. Flood confirms that this is the case in Australia and with the ONA. With the development of computing technology, the creation of the Internet and the ease in which anyone can publish information, Hulnick informs that the problem is not where the intelligence is, but rather “the ability of analysts to sort through it”. While he continues to say that credible intelligence product can be developed from OSINT alone, Treverton takes this point to its logical conclusion. He predicts that analysts will have to compete with CNN, academics, and private organizations like Jane’s or STRATFOR in providing their product. If this is the case, then what separates intelligence collection from researchers of opinion pieces or journal articles?