Why The Coin Doctrine Will Affect The Way Organisations Uphold The Principles Of Ihl Essay

For over 2 centuries, Afghanistan has known virtually no time without war. Beginning around 326 B.C. with the conquests of Alexander the Great, to the Persians, British, Russians and most recently, America and our NATO allies, Afghanistan has been cultivated into the country that it is today through a trial by fire. Regardless of this relentless onslaught of foreign military power, the Afghan people have tirelessly defended their homeland with no outside power ever being able to subdue them completely. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, the country fell into civil war, torn even further apart by fiercely dedicated tribal warlords. This power vacuum led to the rise of a group called the Taliban. Led by a one eyed man

For our purposes, we will use the Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d), to define terrorism. It defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). Examples of terrorism persist on a near daily basis around the world. Unstable countries, such as Afghanistan and Syria, deal with terrorist attacks on a constant basis. The common thread of these attacks is deliberate targeting of civilian populations in order to achieve political objectives. The best known and largest example are

The Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) quarterly report for January is a bleak read. At close to 30%, not only do the Taliban hold more Afghan territory than any time after the 2001 invasion, but "The insurgency is spreading (Afghan forces) thin, threatening rural districts in one area while carrying out ambitious attacks in more populated centers." The Taliban trifecta of high-stakes attacks in late 2015 adds weight to SIGAR’s assessment. Moreover, even before militants briefly overran Kunduz, Kandahar airport and besieged Sangin district, UN figures revealed a 19% increase in “security incidents” between August and October.

Years preceding the terrorist attack on the 11th of September 2001, the CIA and the United States Air Force had already developed the facility to use aerial vehicles, piloted remotely, as weapons. Yet, it was the occurrence of 9/11 that sparked the use of armed remote-piloted aerial vehicles (better known as drones) in the global ‘War of Terror’ led by the United States. The purpose of this position paper is to examine the legality of the covert armed drone program, specifically in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. It will consider the extent of accuracy of the legal frameworks relative to the drone program and targeted killings. To do so, exploring the context in which the United States justifies its actions and military strategies regarding the Global War on Terror is important. This paper will be providing a review of, amongst other references, two pieces of academic literature that discuss the presence of drone warfare in Pakistan: Mark Mazzetti’s The Way of the Knife: The CIA, A Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth and David Sanger’s Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. They will be used as evidence to support the questionability of the legal frameworks relative to the armed drone conflict.

15. Rachels, James. (2003) The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 4th edition. University of Alabama at Birmingham. (Page 100)

Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 and Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2 have slightly different definitions of insurgency. JP 3-34 defines it as the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. FM 3-24.2 defines it as a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. I have problems with both definitions. However, I disagree more with the joint publication. This paper will explain why.

Carl von Clausewitz stated that “the value of [the] object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.” (Clausewitz, 92) With that maxim in mind, it makes strategic sense for an outside power to intervene in an insurgency when it supports the power’s policy objective and the cost of the intervention does not exceed the value of the object.

This paper will be explaining the similarities, and differences, between the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan. There are many topics that bring these two wars together. However, I am only going to be talking about public support, policy objectives, military strategy, weapons, fighting spirit, links to home, and death totals. These topics have a lot of information about them, but there is too much to write about every little detail, so I will cover the broad overview of them. Each paragraph will be about one of the topics. There will also be a discussion about insurgencies and counter insurgency operations. These are two big topics in Vietnam and Afghanistan since almost all of the enemy in both wars were, and are, comprised of insurgents and different types of militia groups.

September 11, 2001 was a devastating day for the United States (US) and countries that had passengers on the airliners that were involved in the terrorist attack. This triggered the US military to be deployed to Afghanistan to fight the Global War on Terror in an effort to eradicate terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda (AQ), and the Haqqani Network (HQN). Since 2001, there has been success of driving the Taliban from power and the death of Osama Bin Laden; however, the US military has lost over two thousand US Soldiers (Buchanan, 2014). Despite the success the US helped provide, the result is that it started to become a concern on how the elite Afghan Soldiers are heavily reliant on the American presence within the country (Mazzetti, 2015). US forces have the collection and airlift capabilities to suppress terrorist organizations within Afghanistan, whereas the Afghan military lacks sufficient training and equipment to possess these capabilities.

Each of these rules must be shown and satisfied. “Failure to fulfill even one renders the resort to force unjust, and thus subject to criticism, resistance, and punishment” (Orend 61). Just war theory is meant to be more demanding than international law. Even though the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to send troops to Somalia, this approving body does not automatically render the gesture moral. One must apply the principals of just war theory first.

In Out of the Mountains, David Kilcullen (2013) identifies and analyzes four of the variables which he believes will shape the character of warfare and conflict in the future. His study of these trends structure a system of security studies that incorporate non-state and unknown actors, as well as unorganized groups and cultural influences into conflict examination. It also allows for the consideration of economic, historical, and developing information while studying warfare. Kilcullen (2013) coins this system of analysis as his “Theory of Competitive Control.” This theory moves beyond the tactical focus that his earlier works exhibited and takes a deeper look at how peace-keeping strategies will be required to evolve as time passes and

In an age when mankind has the ability to completely annihilate itself through nuclear combat, war can be a more terrifying and powerful thought than ever before. Unfortunately, because of the extent of the actions that the Taliban has committed against both America and its own followers, the United States’ war against terrorism seems to be a necessity. I do feel, however, as if there are many things that can be done by the American government in the near future to peacefully approach a more civil and politically involved Afghanistan. Although my feelings on a war against terrorism are mixed, I do feel that significant actions must be taken in order to restrict the spread of

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are

An insurgency is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents.[1] An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency warfare, and may also be opposed by measures to protect the population, and by political and economic actions of various kinds aimed at undermining the insurgents ' claims against the incumbent regime.[2] The nature of insurgencies is an ambiguous concept.

Much recent discourse surrounding humanitarian intervention has focused on the responsibility to protect (R2P). Prevention is a key component for good international relations and few would say it is not important, but as evidence to date would show prevention is very ineffective, the legality of military intervention still needs to be debated, as to date there is no consensus. For any intervention to be legitimate, whether unilateral or multilateral, it must comply with international law. So as not to cause any confusion, any situation in which an “intervention” is done with the permission or by request of the state being intervened, should be considered humanitarian assistance as state sovereignty is not breached. This paper will