1) Consider the following simultaneous-move game, game G1:COLUMNC1C2C3R14, 40, 12-2, -3ROWR26, 105, 51, 12R38, 6-1, -4-3, 51.1) Using formal notation, explain why the table above is a strategic-form representation ofgame G1 by referring to the elements that comprise a strategic-form representation. [You donot have to give a complete enumeration of the players' utility functions; an example will besufficient.]1.2) Enumerate the joint strategy set of this game using formal notation.1.3) Does the game have a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium? Briefly explain.Let S = S; for each player i be the player's strategy set, and for n 2 1 let S} denote thosestrategies of player i surviving after the nth round of elimination of strictly dominatedstrategies (IESDS). That is, s¡ e S' if s; e S-1 and s; is not strictly dominated in S"-1. With"in Sn-1" we mean in the (possibly reduced) game which has the joint strategy space S"-1 =Skow x ScoLUMN- (see JR p.309– 310.)1.4) For the above game, determine S for all i for all n > 1. Justify your answers.1.5) Write down the game's pure strategy Nash equilibrium(s) (NE).1.6) Explain in what sense the NE solution concept is more precise than the IESDS solutionconcept.

(Note: Since there are multiple parts, only first three have been solved). (1.1) The game written…

1) Consider the following simultaneous-move game, game G1: COLUMN C1 C2 C3 R1 4,4 0, 12 -2, -3 ROW R2 6, 10 5, 5 1, 12 R3 8, 6 -1, -4 -3, 5 1.1) Using formal notation, explain why the table above is a strategic-form representation of game G1 by referring to the elements that comprise a strategic-form representation. [You do not have to give a complete enumeration of the players' utility functions; an example will be sufficient.] 1.2) Enumerate the joint strategy set of this game using formal notation. 1.3) Does the game have a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium? Briefly explain.

1) Consider the following simultaneous-move game, game G1: COLUMN C1 C2 C3 R1 4,4 0, 12 -2, -3 ROW R2 6, 10 5, 5 1, 12 R3 8, 6 -1, -4 -3, 5 1.1) Using formal notation, explain why the table above is a strategic-form representation of game G1 by referring to the elements that comprise a strategic-form representation. [You do not have to give a complete enumeration of the players' utility functions; an example will be sufficient.] 1.2) Enumerate the joint strategy set of this game using formal notation. 1.3) Does the game have a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium? Briefly explain.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3MC

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