1. Suppose your professor announces that each student in your large lecture class who receives the highestscore (no matter how high) on the take-home final exam will get an A in the course. The professor points outthat if the entire class colludes successfully everyone could get the same score. Is it likely that everyone inthe class will get an A?2. Suppose Farmer Smith from Kansas and Farmer Jones from Missouri agree to restrict their combinedoutput of wheat in an attempt to increase the price and profits. How likely do you think the Smith-Jonescartel is to succeed? Explain.3. Explain how the joint profit-maximizing price of colluding firms under oligopoly is determined? Howabout output?

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1. Suppose your professor announces that each student in your large lecture class who receives the highest Score (no matter how high) on the take-home final exam will get an A in the course. The professor points out that if the entire class colludes successfully everyone could get the same score. Is it likely that everyone in the class will get an A?

1. Suppose your professor announces that each student in your large lecture class who receives the highest Score (no matter how high) on the take-home final exam will get an A in the course. The professor points out that if the entire class colludes successfully everyone could get the same score. Is it likely that everyone in the class will get an A?

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter13: Positive Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 23P: HighFlyer Airlines wants to build new airplanes with greatly increased cabin space. This will allow...

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