second photo only please, # 14. only Thakyou!! 13 Secondhand smoke L Assume that the daily demand for packs of cigarettes in thetobacco-addicted nation of Pcoria isQ=100 – PFurther assume that the marginal cost of producing a pack of cigarettes is $6, and thatthe market for cigarettes is perfectly competitive. Assume that each pack of cigarettessmoked does §6 worth of health damage to the smoker in the form of increased cancerrisk and a total of $5 worth of health damage to the smoker's neighbors via secondhandsmoke. Finally, assume that all Pcorian cigarette consumers are aware of these costs.a Assume that a Pcorian smoker named Jay states that he is willing to buy a pack ofcigarettes for $8, but not a penny more. In this market, where the price is $6 perpack, what are the private benefits and private costs incurred whenever he buys apack of cigarettes? Is it privately efficient for him to buy a pack of cigarettes at thisprice?b What about the public benefits and public costs? Is it socially efficient for him tobuy a pack of cigarettes at this price?c Suppose that, due to the introduction of a hyper-effective tobacco fertilizer, thecost of producing a pack of cigarettes plummets to $1. Now is it socially efficientfor Jay to purchase a pack of cigarettes? 14 Secondhand smoke II. Review the assumptions from the previous problem, andassume that it still costs $6 to produce a pack of cigarettes.a Draw the private supply curve and the private demand curve in this market. Whatis the privately efficient quantity of packs purchased per day?b Draw the public supply curve in this market. Explain why it differs from the privatesupply curve, and how this represents the externality from secondhand smoke.Highlight the area(s) of your diagram that represents social loss, and interpret thisloss in terms of cigarette smoking.c What is the socially efficient quantity of packs purchased per day?d Suppose that, due to the introduction of a hyper-effective tobacco fertilizer, thecost of producing a pack of cigarettes plummets to $1. How does this affect thelevel of smoking and the level of social loss? Explain.e Suppose the government decides to pursue a Pigouvian solution to eliminate socialloss. What sort of tax or subsidy would they implement, and what is the resultingquantity of cigarette packs purchased?f The opposition party in the Pcorian parliament loudly opposes the proposed taxplan as government meddling. The opposition leader invokes the Coase theoremand says that the socially efficient level of smoking will occur even in the absence ofgovernment intervention. How are property rights assigned in this instance? Whymight the Coase theorem not apply in this setting?g Assume that the Coase theorem actually does apply in this setting. The Pcorianparliament passes a new law giving anyone the right to forbid his neighbor fromsmoking. Who benefits, and who is harmed, by this new law? How will this affectthe level of smoking?

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13 Secondhand smoke L Assume that the daily demand for packs of cigarettes in the- tobacco-addicted nation of Pcoria is Q=100 – P Further assume that the marginal cost of producing a pack of cigarettes is $6, and that the market for cigarettes is perfectly competitive. Assume that each pack of cigarettes smoked does §6 worth of health damage to the smoker in the form of increased cancer risk and a total of 65 worth of health damage to the smoker's neighbors via secondhand

13 Secondhand smoke L Assume that the daily demand for packs of cigarettes in the- tobacco-addicted nation of Pcoria is Q=100 – P Further assume that the marginal cost of producing a pack of cigarettes is $6, and that the market for cigarettes is perfectly competitive. Assume that each pack of cigarettes smoked does §6 worth of health damage to the smoker in the form of increased cancer risk and a total of 65 worth of health damage to the smoker's neighbors via secondhand

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter17: Income, Poverty, And Health Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18P

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Assume that the daily demand for packs of cigarettes in the tobacco-addicted nation of Pcoria is Q=100−PFurther assume that the marginal cost of producing a pack of cigarettes is §6, and that the market for cigarettes is perfectly competitive. Assume that each pack of cigarettes smoked does §6 worth of health damage to the smoker in the form of increased cancer risk and a total of §5 worth of health damage to the smoker’s neighbors via secondhand smoke. Finally, assume that all Pcorian cigarette consumers are aware of these costs. a. Assume that a Pcorian smoker named Jay states that he is willing to buy a pack of cigarettes for §8, but not a penny more. In this market, where the price is §6 per pack, what are the private benefits and private costs incurred whenever he buys a pack of cigarettes? Is it privately efficient for him to buy a pack of cigarettes at this price? b. What about the public benefits and public costs? Is it socially efficient for him to buy a pack of cigarettes at…
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