A village has 5 farmers. Each summer, all the farmers graze their sheep on the village green. The cost of buying and caring for sheep is very small and can be regarded as 0. The value to a farmer of grazing a sheep on the green when a total of F sheep are grazing is v(F) per sheep: F v(F) (price of a sheep) 1 $11 $10 $8 $5 $1 6+ $0 A Nash equilibrium outcome is (choose one) every farmer owns one sheep. one farmer owns 5 sheep and no other farmers own any sheep. three farmers own a total of 3 sheep and the other two own O sheep. one farmer owns 3 sheep and the other four own O sheep.

A village has 5 farmers. Each summer, all the farmers graze their sheep on the village green. The cost of buying and caring for sheep is very small and can be regarded as 0. The value to a farmer of grazing a sheep on the green when a total of F sheep are grazing is v(F) per sheep: F v(F) (price of a sheep) 1 $11 $10 $8 $5 $1 6+ $0 A Nash equilibrium outcome is (choose one) every farmer owns one sheep. one farmer owns 5 sheep and no other farmers own any sheep. three farmers own a total of 3 sheep and the other two own O sheep. one farmer owns 3 sheep and the other four own O sheep.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.4P

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