Assume there is just one kebab stall selling kebab to students at the University of London, which we will call Ammar's. Because there is no direct competition at the stall, the seller can sell his kebab for $4 and earn $800 per day. However, Anwar, a Kebab vendor, is considering establishing up shop just down the road from Ammar's in the University of London market. When confronted by Anwar, Ammar has two options: sell at the same high price ($4) or charge a low price below the cost in the hopes of discouraging Anwar from setting up his stall. The game and payoffs for the standard game between Ammar and Anwar are listed below in the image attached.
Assume there is just one kebab stall selling kebab to students at the University of London, which we will call Ammar's. Because there is no direct competition at the stall, the seller can sell his kebab for $4 and earn $800 per day. However, Anwar, a Kebab vendor, is considering establishing up shop just down the road from Ammar's in the University of London market. When confronted by Anwar, Ammar has two options: sell at the same high price ($4) or charge a low price below the cost in the hopes of discouraging Anwar from setting up his stall. The game and payoffs for the standard game between Ammar and Anwar are listed below in the image attached.
a. Find the Nash equilibrium or equilibria (if any). Justify your answer clearly.
b. Is there any dominant strategy for each of the shawarma sellers? Clearly
explain the way you find the answer.
c. Do you think Bilal can threaten Ali so that Ali will not enter the shawarma
market in IIUM? Justify your answer clearly.
d. Draw the extensive form of this game using a game tree. Find the sub perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) from this game tree. Justify your answer clearly.
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 4 steps with 3 images