Consider a market with demand P(Q) = 112 3Q in which 9 identical firms compete. All firms face T C(Q) = 52Q. Let X = Q2 + Q3 + . + Q9. (a) Write out the residual demand curve for firm 1 in terms of X and Q1. (b) Find the corresponding marginal revenue (c) What is the reaction function for firm 1 (in terms of X)

Consider a market with demand P(Q) = 112 3Q in which 9 identical firms compete. All firms face T C(Q) = 52Q. Let X = Q2 + Q3 + . + Q9. (a) Write out the residual demand curve for firm 1 in terms of X and Q1. (b) Find the corresponding marginal revenue (c) What is the reaction function for firm 1 (in terms of X)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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