If a linear programming problem's solution is not feasible: it is not fun O all constraints have not been met at least one constraint has not been net one or more decision variables has a negative value the objective function cannot be met

In a transition probability matrix, the sum of every column is 1.  True  False

Need help only with finding the optimal solution

Yoda just got a job offer. The job is located in Awayville. Awayville is 70 miles north of Binghamton. Yoda wants to accept the job offer, still live in Binghamton, and commute to Awayville on a daily basis. This will result in travel expense relates to approximately 700 miles per week. To make this plan work, Yoda needs a car that will get at least 25 miles per gallon of gasoline. Yoda goes to Darth's Used Car Dealership. Yoda tells Darth that Yoda needs a car that gets at least 25 miles per gallon of gasoline. Yoda explains the Awayville job situation and Darth says, "I understand - I will check my inventory - I will be right back." Darth goes into his office and looks through two different files of used car inventory. One file contains all cars that get over 25 miles per gallon of gasoline and the other file contains all cars that get under 25 miles per gallon of gasoline. Darth selects a used car from the file that indicates that the cars get over 25 miles per gallon of gasoline…

What is the algebraic formulation for this question, including objective function and constraints

A teacher decides that all students should be able to swim 50 yards to pass a swim requirement.  This is an example of: Group of answer choices A norm-referenced standard A critieron-refrenced standard formative evaluation summative evaluation

Consider a cheap talk game in which Nature chooses the sender’s type andthere are three feasible types: x, y, and z, which occur with probability 1/4, 1/4,and 1/2, respectively. The sender learns her type and then chooses one of fourpossible messages: m1, m2, m3, or m4. The receiver observes the sender’smessage and chooses one of three actions: a, b, or c. The payoffs are shown in the table below. a. Suppose the sender’s strategy is as follows: (1) if the type is x, thenchoose message m1, and (2) if the type is y or z, then choose messagem2. The receiver’s strategy is the following: (1) if the message is m1,then choose action a; (2) if the message is m2, then choose action b;and (3) if the message is m3 or m4, then choose action a. For appropriatelyspecified beliefs for the receiver, show that this strategy pair is aperfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium.b. Find a separating perfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium.

Please help me.  Thankyou.