Let us consider a market where 10 firms l= {1,2,..,10} compete à la Cournot (quantity- setting competition). The inverse demand function is given by p( Q) =1200-18Q , where Q= Eiqi. The cost function is homogeneous and it is C( q) =10q. 1.the profit functions of eachiEl is: 2.Derive the best reply functions for each firm 3.Derive the market price in the Nash equilibrium of the game.

Let us consider a market where 10 firms l= {1,2,..,10} compete à la Cournot (quantity- setting competition). The inverse demand function is given by p( Q) =1200-18Q , where Q= Eiqi. The cost function is homogeneous and it is C( q) =10q. 1.the profit functions of eachiEl is: 2.Derive the best reply functions for each firm 3.Derive the market price in the Nash equilibrium of the game.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.4P

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