Match the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that V[Choose] candidate should be declared the winner. irrelevant If a candidate is favored alternatives when compared separately with every majority other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. monotonicity If a candidate wins an head-to-head election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election. <>

Match the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that V[Choose] candidate should be declared the winner. irrelevant If a candidate is favored alternatives when compared separately with every majority other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. monotonicity If a candidate wins an head-to-head election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election. <>

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Two staff managers in the ΠBΦ sorority, the house manager (player 1) and kitchen manager (player 2), must select a resident assistant from a poolof three candidates: {a, b, c}. Player 1 prefers a to b, and b to c. Player 2 prefers b to a, and a toc. The process that is imposed on them is as follows: First, the house manager vetoes one of thecandidates and announces the veto to the central office for staff selection and to the kitchenmanager. Next the kitchen manager vetoes one of the remaining two candidates and announcesit to the central office. Finally the director of the central office assigns the remaining candidateto be a resident assistant at ΠBΦ.a. Model this as an extensive-form game (using a game tree). You will need to define theutilities of both players.b. Find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) for this game. Is it unique?c. Now assume that before the two players play the game, player 2 can send an alienatinge-mail to one of the candidates, which would…
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