Setup from Question 1) An expected utility maximiser owns a car worth £60 000 and has a bank account with £20 000. The money in the bank is safe, but there is a 50% probability that the car will be stolen. The utility of wealth for the agent is u(y) = In(y) and they have no other assets.Question 2) Consider the setup from Question 1. A risk-neutral insurance company is willing to insure the car at the premium of a = £2/3 for every onepound of coverage.How much insurance coverage will the individual choose to buy?O a. £30000O b. £40 000O c.£80 000O d. £60 000

Answer 1 The person would be killing to pay the £ 20000 the reason for the same is that he has the…

Setup from Question 1) An expected utility maximiser owns a car worth £60 000 and has a bank account with £20 000. The money in the bank is safe, but there is a 50% probability that the car will be stolen. The utility of wealth for the agent is u(y) = In(y) and they have no other assets. Question 2)

Setup from Question 1) An expected utility maximiser owns a car worth £60 000 and has a bank account with £20 000. The money in the bank is safe, but there is a 50% probability that the car will be stolen. The utility of wealth for the agent is u(y) = In(y) and they have no other assets. Question 2)

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter17: Income, Poverty, And Health Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 25P

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Suppose the demand for anxiety medication prescriptions is given by P = 300 – Q. Suppose the marginal cost for a prescription of anxiety medicine is constant at $100 per prescription. a. What is the quantity demanded in the absence of any insurance coverage for anxiety medication? b. Now, suppose there is full insurance coverage for anxiety medication (i.e. no cost-sharing at all). What is the new quantity demanded? c. Finally, suppose insurance covers anxiety medication, but there is 20% coinsurance, meaning that individuals must pay 20% of the cost of anxiety medication out of pocket. What is the new quantity demanded? d. Under the insurance structure given in part (c), what is the deadweight loss associated with the presence of insurance coverage?
18.5 Suppose there is a 50–50 chance that an individual with log- arithmic utility from wealth and with a current wealth of $20,000 will suffer a loss of $10,000 from a car accident. Insur- ance is competitively provided at actuarially fair rates. Compute the outcome if the individual buys full insurance. Compute the outcome if the individual buys only partial insurance covering half the loss. Show that the outcome in part (a) is preferred. Now suppose that individuals who buy the partial rather than the full insurance policy take more care when driv- ing, reducing the damage from loss from $10,000 to $7,000. What would be the actuarially fair price of the partial policy? Does the individual now prefer the full or the partial policy?
If a doctor knows that an insurance company will pay for most of a patient's bill, the doctor has more of an incentive to require additional medical procedures and tests, even if the patient may not require them. This is an example of O A. adverse selection. O B. the principal-agent problem. O C. asymmetric information. O D. moral hazard.
Amy's utility depends upon her income, w. Her utility function is √w. She receives a prize that depends on the roll of a dice. If she rolls a 3 or 4 or 6, she will receive $400. Otherwise, if she rolls a 1 or 2 or 5, she will receive $100.4. A competitive market offers insurance at a fair premium against the risk of rolling a 1, 2 or 5. What is the utility of Amy if she buys insurance (round at the second decimal)?5. How much money beyond the fair premium is Amy willing to pay to get rid of risk entirely?
5 Suppose that a person’s demand curve for physician office visits is P = 200 – 20Q, where P is the price of an office visit, and Q is the number of physician visits per year. Also, suppose that the marginal cost of an office visit is always $60. c. Suppose this person obtains health insurance. The policy has no deductible, but has a coinsurance rate of 50 percent. How many visits will occur now? d. Suppose that the policy has no deductible but has a $20 co-payment. How many visits will occur now? e. Suppose the policy has a $20 co-payment and a $500 deductible. How many visits will occur now? f. Calculate the deadweight losses in the policies described in parts c, d, and e.
If people get higher pay from insurance than their pre premiums. Will this increase or decrease the death rate of average persons? Is this an example of moral hazard or adverse selection? How will an insurance company deal with these problems.
1. Consider an insurance contract with the premium r=$200 and payout q=$800 a.) John has healthy-state income IH = $900 and sick-state income IS = $100. He has a probability of illness p = 0.2. Is the contract fair and/or full for John? b.) What is John’s expected income without this insurance contract? What is John’s expected income with this insurance contract?
please answer all multiple choice question, thanks. 1. Suppose an insurance company wishes to separate out drivers based on whether they are high-risk or low-risk drivers. It can do this by offering two different pricing schemes: one the appeals to low-risk drivers and another that appeals to high risk drivers. Which of the following pricing schemes would best appeal to a high-risk driver? NB: a deductable is the amount that the driver would have to pay in the event of a claim: a high premium but low deductable b. a high premium and high deductible c. None, high risk drivers prefer not to take out insurance. d. a low premium and high deductable 2. The incentive of imperfectly monitored workers to shirk can be reduced by: a. lower levels of monitoring and lower wages b. lower levels of monitoring and offering year-end bonuses c. higher levels of monitoring and offering year-end bonuses d. higher levels of monitoring and lower wages 3. Research has shown that investors in the stock…
Setup from Question 1) An expected utility maximiser owns a car worth £60000 and has a bank account with £20000. The money in the bank is safe, but there is a 50% probability that the car will be stolen. The utility of wealth for the agent is u(y)=ln⁡(y) and they have no other assets. Setup from question 2)Consider the setup from Question 1. A risk-neutral insurance company is willing to insure the car at the premium of π=£2/3 for every one pound of coverage. Question 3:
Suppose that the buyers do not know the quality of any particular bicycle for sale, but the sellers do knowthe quality of the bike they sell. The price at which a bike is traded is determined by demand and supply.Each buyer wants at most one bicycle.(ii) Assuming that each buyer purchases a bike only if its expected quality is higher than the price,and each seller is willing to sell their bike only if the price exceeds their valuation, what is theequilibrium outcome in this market?
In an insurance system, would you expect each person to receive in benefits pretty much what they pay in premiums or is it just that the average benefits paid will equal the average premiums paid?
How can moral hazard lead to more costly insurance premiums than one was expected?