Suppose that a sales force has found 20 qualified buyers and has begun the sales process. The sales manager estimates that 10% eventually proceeds to make a purchase. Assume that a professional company offers three services, priced at $2,000, $7,000 and $20,000, respectively. Based on past results or the sales manager’s estimates, you project that 60% of first-time buyers will choose the cheapest option, 30% will choose the middle option and 10% will choose the most expensive option. a. Calculate the size of a likely sale for any prospect that makes a purchase. b. How many qualified buyers must be found in order for the company to generate $80,000 in sales in a given period? Your final answer must be rounded to the nearest whole numbe

Suppose that a sales force has found 20 qualified buyers and has begun the sales process. The sales manager estimates that 10% eventually proceeds to make a purchase. Assume that a professional company offers three services, priced at $2,000, $7,000 and $20,000, respectively. Based on past results or the sales manager’s estimates, you project that 60% of first-time buyers will choose the cheapest option, 30% will choose the middle option and 10% will choose the most expensive option. a. Calculate the size of a likely sale for any prospect that makes a purchase. b. How many qualified buyers must be found in order for the company to generate $80,000 in sales in a given period? Your final answer must be rounded to the nearest whole numbe

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.11P

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The promoter of a football game is concerned that it will rain. She has the option of spending $14,040 on insurance that will pay $39,000 if it rains. She estimates that the revenue from the game will be $65,040 if it does not rain and $30,040 if it does rain. What must the chance of rain be if buying the policy has the same expected return as not buying it? Write expressions showing the expected returns if the promoter does and does not purchase the insurance, using p to represent the probability of rain. Without insurance, E(return) = With insurance, E(return) = The chance of rain must be _%.
Ma3. The payoff matrix below shows the payoffs for Stefan and Imani in a two strategy game. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, Stefan will play strategy Up with a probability of 1/5 and strategy Down with a probability of 4/5, and Imani will play strategy Left with a probability of 2/5 and strategy Right with a probability of 3/5. What is Stefan's expected payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium? 10.6 5 4.56 10.4
Victoria founded a start-up several years ago, together with her Macedonian friends. At first, she was fairly poor and therefore very afraid of taking risks. Any negative shock could send the company into bankruptcy. Nowadays her business is thriving, stretching across several markets from Europe to Asia. Victoria no longer worries about taking monetary risks. In fact she enjoys a good gamble over horse races from time to time. How would you draw Victoria's utility function in a way that describes her changing taste for risk as her wealth increased? Please draw a graph and comment. Please do fast ASAP fast
Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $250. If I spends $40 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $175. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $50 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $50 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $20 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially‐optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially‐optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. 1. Under a negligence standard, what is I’s dominant strategy? a) I does not have a…
Scenario 2 Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function ( sqrt c) . Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. Refer to Scenario 2 Calculate Lex’s and Tess' expected utilities without insurance. (each one separated) Round to two decimal places for both
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Ex 8. An airline's data indicate that 50 percent of people who begin the online process of booking a flight never complete the process and pay for the flight. To reduce this percentage, the airline is considering changing its website so that the entire booking process, including flight and seat selection and payment, can be done on two simple pages rather than the current four pages. A random sample of 300 customers who begin the booking process are exposed to the new system, and 117 of them do not complete the process. a. Formulate the null and alternative hypotheses needed to attempt to provide evidence that the new system has reduced the noncompletion percentage. b. Use critical values to perform the hypothesis test by setting α equal to .10, .05, .01, and .001
You are considering a $500,000 investment in the fast-food industry and have narrowed your choice to either a McDonald’s or a Penn Station East Coast Subs franchise. McDonald’s indicates that, based on the location where you are proposing to open a new restaurant, there is a 25 percent probability that aggregate 10-year profits (net of the initial investment) will be $16 million, a 50 percent probability that profits will be $8 million, and a 25 percent probability that profits will be −$1.6 million. The aggregate 10-year profit projections (net of the initial investment) for a Penn Station East Coast Subs franchise is $48 million with a 2.5 percent probability, $8 million with a 95 percent probability, and −$48 million with a 2.5 percent probability. Considering both the risk and expected profitability of these two investment opportunities, which is the better investment? Explain carefully.
Matrix question: Suppose centuries ago, a group of people lived in an isolated small village. They loved their land and had no incentives to move. Assume that for the job opportunities, anyone living in that village had five options, to become either a farmer, butcher, baker, teacher, or doctor. For simplification, we name the above 5 job types as Option A, B, C, D and E, respectively. It is also known that: Once a resident became a farmer, the probabilities for him/her to continue being a farmer or become a butcher, baker, teacher or doctor would be 50%, 28%, 10%, 10% and 2%, respectively. Once a resident became a butcher, the probabilities for him/her to continue being butcher or become a farmer, baker, teacher or doctor would be 50%, 20%, 10%, 19% and 1%, respectively. Once a resident became a baker, the probabilities for him/her to continue being a baker or become a farmer, butcher, teacher or doctor would be 50%, 20%, 20%, 8% and 2%, respectively. Once a resident became a…
Scenario 2 Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function (sqrt c) . Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. Refer to Scenario 2 If an insurance company knows the probability of Tess experiencing an adverse event, what is the actuarially fair premium charged to Tess per $1 of benefit? Round to two decimal places
A printer manufacturer estimates that the average purchaser of a printer will also purchase six ink refills over the lifetime of the printer. The relevant data are: Printer: price: $400, margin: $100 Refills: price: $40, margin: $30 The manufacturer is considering increasing the price of printers by 10% to $440. What volume decrease in the sales of printers is the stay-even sales change for the firm? (Ignore the issue of discounting the value of future ink refill sales. Imagine, for example, that all six are purchased upfront with the printer). A. 11.5% B. 12.5% C. 13.5% D. 14.5% Use = % Q = (Pold - Cold)/(Pnew - Cold) - 1
Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game under a rule of no liability? Question…