The action set of player 1 is {1,2, 3, 4, 5} (not considering the $ sign). When both players are rational, the theoretical SPNE is (5, 1).Now answer the following problems.What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 2$ offer of player 1?Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign.5|5What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 4$ offer of player 1?Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign.100100 Consider the following two player extensive form game which was introduced in part 4 of this lecture as Ultimatum game. Here we consider themodification that the players are friends and the happiness of sharing has some utility which is added for both players.26A1,5 0,00,04,2 6,00,0The action set of player 1 is {1,2, 3, 4, 5} (not considering the $ sign). When both players are rational, the theoretical SPNE is (5, 1).Now answer the following problems.

Strategies (1,2,3,4,5) Both the individuals are rational and choose (5,1) as Nash equilibrium for…

The action set of player 1 is {1,2, 3, 4, 5} (not considering the $ sign). When both players are rational, the theoretical SPNE is (5, 1). Now answer the following problems. What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 2$ offer of player 1? Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign. 5| What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 4$ offer of player 1? Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign. 100 100

The action set of player 1 is {1,2, 3, 4, 5} (not considering the $ sign). When both players are rational, the theoretical SPNE is (5, 1). Now answer the following problems. What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 2$ offer of player 1? Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign. 5| What is the dollar equivalent of utility of happiness to ensure player 2 to accept the 4$ offer of player 1? Just write the number, no need to put the $ sign. 100 100

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.8P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Is it possible that Step. 3 contains a contradiction? As "If Player 1 plays Ball (B): Player 2 meets (M) if the expected payoff of meeting is greater than the expected payoff of avoiding." and then, "If Player 1 has Dinner (D): Player 2 meets (M) if the expected payoff of meeting is greater than the expected payoff of avoiding." The same arises in the one for player 2. Is for both the second sentence meant to be "smaller than"? If not, please elaborate.
Consider the following 3×3 two player normal form game that is being repeated infinite number of times. The discounting factor for player 1 is δ1 and the discounting factor for player 2 is δ2. left center right up (10 ,40) (32 ,75) (65 ,58) middle (55 ,63) (21 ,45) (23 ,83) down (14 ,76) (16 ,65) (37 ,42) a. Find the total discounted utility for player 2 if player 1 decides to play middle all the time and player 2 decides to play left all the time. b. Now suppose both players are following the strategy of part (a) until player 1 decides to play up in the 6th stage. The the new NE after the 6th stage is (up,right). Find the total discounted utility for player 2 in this case. c. Using the grim trigger strategy, find the minimum value of δ2. Can you find any anomaly in your calculated value of δ2?
Consider the following claim: “If a decision maker prefers one given lottery that yields $x with probability 1 over another given lottery whose expected return is $x, then we can fully characterize the agent's risk attitude. That is, this information comparing two given lotteries is enough to determine if the decision maker is risk averse, risk loving or risk neutral.” If this claim is TRUE, then provide a proof. If it is FALSE, then prove your argument by providing an explanation.
Let b(p,s,t) be the bet that pays out s with probability p and t with probability 1−p. We make the three following statements: S1: The CME for b is the value m such that u(m)=E[u(b(p,s,t))]. S2: A risk averse attitude corresponds to the case CME smaller than E[b(p,s,t))]. S3: A risk seeking attitude corresponds to a convex utility function. Are these statements true or false?
1- Determine the strategies that the player can follow by applying the rule of thumb to reduce the matrix (2x2)2- Find the value of the match by the analytical method.
Two partners start a business. Each has two possible strategies, spend full time or secretly take a second job and spend only part time on the business. Any profits that the business makes will be split equally between the two partners, regardless of whether they work full time or part time for the business. If a partner takes a second job, he will earn $20,000 from this job plus his share of profits from the business. If he spends full time on the business, his only source of income is his share of profits from this business. If both partners spend full time on the business, total profits will be $200,000. If one partner spends full time on the business and the other takes a second job, the business profits will be $80,000. If both partners take second job, the total business profits are $20,000. a) This game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria, but has a mixed strategy equilibrium. b) This game has two Nash equilibria, one in which each partner has an income of $100,000 and one in…
A new government lottery has been announced. Each person who buys a ticket submits an integer between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose submission is closest to four-fifths of the average of all submissions. If ties occur, the price will be shared. If Chloe expects other players to select numbers randomly, what number should she choose? Chloe should choose the number (a)_____ if you expect all other players to exhibit the same depth of reasoning as Chloe, what number would you choose? you should choose the number (b)______
ollowing is the payoff table for the Pittsburgh Development Corporation (PDC) Condominium Project. Amounts are in millions of dollars. State of Nature Decision Alternative Strong Demand S1 Weak Demand S2 Small complex, d1 8 7 Medium complex, d2 14 5 Large complex, d3 20 -9 Suppose PDC is optimistic about the potential for the luxury high-rise condominium complex and that this optimism leads to an initial subjective probability assessment of 0.8 that demand will be strong (S1) and a corresponding probability of 0.2 that demand will be weak (S2). Assume the decision alternative to build the large condominium complex was found to be optimal using the expected value approach. Also, a sensitivity analysis was conducted for the payoffs associated with this decision alternative. It was found that the large complex remained optimal as long as the payoff for the strong demand was greater than or equal to $17.5 million and as long as the payoff for…
Consider the two-player game: a. Find the strategies that are consistent with both players being rationaland each player believing the other player is rational.b. In addition to that assumed in part (a), assume that player 2 knows player1 knows player 2 is rational. Find strategies consistent with these beliefs.
Following is the payoff table for the Pittsburgh Development Corporation (PDC) Condominium Project. Amounts are in millions of dollars. State of Nature Decision Alternative Strong Demand S1 Weak Demand S2 Small complex, d1 8 7 Medium complex, d2 14 5 Large complex, d3 20 -9 Suppose PDC is optimistic about the potential for the luxury high-rise condominium complex and that this optimism leads to an initial subjective probability assessment of 0.8 that demand will be strong (S1) and a corresponding probability of 0.2 that demand will be weak (S2). Assume the decision alternative to build the large condominium complex was found to be optimal using the expected value approach. Also, a sensitivity analysis was conducted for the payoffs associated with this decision alternative. It was found that the large complex remained optimal as long as the payoff for the strong demand was greater than or equal to $17.5 million and as long as the payoff for…
Following is the payoff table for the Pittsburgh Development Corporation (PDC) Condominium Project. Amounts are in millions of dollars. State of Nature Decision Alternative Strong Demand S1 Weak Demand S2 Small complex, d1 8 7 Medium complex, d2 14 5 Large complex, d3 20 -9 Suppose PDC is optimistic about the potential for the luxury high-rise condominium complex and that this optimism leads to an initial subjective probability assessment of 0.8 that demand will be strong (S1) and a corresponding probability of 0.2 that demand will be weak (S2). Assume the decision alternative to build the large condominium complex was found to be optimal using the expected value approach. Also, a sensitivity analysis was conducted for the payoffs associated with this decision alternative. It was found that the large complex remained optimal as long as the payoff for the strong demand was greater than or equal to $17.5 million and as long as the payoff for…
Consider this situation faced by a first-semester senior in mechanical engineering who is exhausted from extensive job interviewing and penniless from excessive partying. Mary’s impulse is to accept immediately a highly attractive job offer to work in her brother’s successful manufacturing company. She would then be able to relax for a year or two, save some money, and then return to college to complete her senior year and graduate. Mary is cautious about this impulsive desire, because it may lead to no college degree at all. Develop at least two formulations for Mary’s problem. Identify feasible solutions for each problem formulation in (a).