Suppose the European Union (EU) was investigated and proposed a merger between two of the largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on some economists' definition of the relevant market, the two firms proposing to merge enjoyed a combined market share of about two-thirds, while another firm essentially controlled the remaining share of the market. Additionally, suppose that the (wholesale) market elasticity of demand for Scotch liquor is -1.5 and that it costs $16.20 to produce and distribute each liter of Scotch. Based only on these data, provide quantitative estimates of the likely pre- and postmerger prices in the wholesale market for premium Scotch liquor. Instructions: Do not round intermediate calculations. Enter your final responses rounded to the nearest penny (two decimal places). Pre-merger price: $| Post-merger price: $

Suppose the European Union (EU) was investigated and proposed a merger between two of the largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on some economists' definition of the relevant market, the two firms proposing to merge enjoyed a combined market share of about two-thirds, while another firm essentially controlled the remaining share of the market. Additionally, suppose that the (wholesale) market elasticity of demand for Scotch liquor is -1.5 and that it costs $16.20 to produce and distribute each liter of Scotch. Based only on these data, provide quantitative estimates of the likely pre- and postmerger prices in the wholesale market for premium Scotch liquor. Instructions: Do not round intermediate calculations. Enter your final responses rounded to the nearest penny (two decimal places). Pre-merger price: $| Post-merger price: $

Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)

9th Edition

ISBN:9781305260948

Author:Irvin B. Tucker

Publisher:Irvin B. Tucker

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20SQ

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Suppose the European Union (EU) was investigated and proposed a merger between two of the largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on some economists’ definition of the relevant market, the two firms proposing to merge enjoyed a combined market share of about two-thirds, while another firm essentially controlled the remaining share of the market. Additionally, suppose that the (wholesale) market elasticity of demand for Scotch liquor is −1.4 and that it costs $15.90 to produce and distribute each liter of Scotch. Based only on these data, provide quantitative estimates of the likely pre- and postmerger prices in the wholesale market for premium Scotch liquor. Instructions: Do not round intermediate calculations. Enter your final responses rounded to the nearest penny (two decimal places). Pre-merger price: $ Post-merger price: $
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Suppose the European Union (EU) is investigating a proposed merger between two of the largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on some economists’ definition of the relevant market, the two firms proposing to merge enjoyed a combined market share of about two-thirds, while another firm essentially controlled the remaining share of the market. Additionally, suppose that the (wholesale) market elasticity of demand for Scotch liquor is –1.3 and that it costs $16.20 to produce and distribute each liter of Scotch. Based only on these data, provide quantitative estimates of the likely pre- and postmerger prices in the wholesale market for premium Scotch liquor. In light of your estimates, are you surprised that the EU might raise concerns about potential anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger? Explain carefully.
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Suppose the European Union (EU) is investigating a proposed merger between two of largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on estimates from the EU’s economists, these two firms have a combined market share of about two-thirds of all sales in the relevant market. The only remaining firm controls the other one-third of the market. Economists have estimated that the wholesale market price elasticity of demand for Scotch is −1.3 and the unit cost to produce and distribute the Scotch is 16.20 per liter. Using the available information, provide quantitative estimates of the pre- and post-merger prices for Scotch in the wholesale market. In your opinion, is the EU’s concern about the merger justified? Why or Why not?
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