Suppose the market demand curve is given by P= 150 - 5x-5y, where x is the output that Amy produces, and y is Beau's output level. Amy's marginal cost of production is $10 and Beau's marginal cost of production is $30. If Amy and Beau take the output decision sequentially and without any cooperation, where Amy is the leader, Amy's profit-maximizing production level is x = , and Beau produces y= units. The market price is $ . Amy's producer surplus is $ and Beau's producer surplus is $
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- Suppose you have two types of users for your software: basic users and professionals. The value each group places on your basic program and your advanced program is given in the table below. Value of Product basic users Professionals basic program $65 $60 advance program $75 $150 You don’t know who exactly your basic and professional users are. How might you price your advanced program so that only your professionals by that version and you maximize profits? Group of answer choices $144 $150 $65 $75Mary and Raj are the only two growers who provide organically grown corn to a local grocery store. Table below represents the choices available to Mary and Raj and the payoffs associated with each outcome. What is the best choice for Raj if he is sure that Mary will cooperate? If Mary thinks Raj will cheat, what should Mary do and why? What is the prisoner’s dilemma result? (A = Work independently; B = Cooperate and Raise prices. Each results entry lists Raj earnings first, and Mary's earnings second.) Mary A B Raj A ($100, $100) ($200, $0) B ($0, $200) ($150, $150)Splitting Pizza: You and a friend are in an Italian restaurant, and the owner offers both of you a free eight-slice pizza under the following condition. Each of you must simultaneously announce how many slices you would like; that is, each player i ∈ 1, 2 names his desired amount of pizza, 0 ≤ si ≤ 8. If s1 + s2 ≤ 8 then the players get their demands (and the owner eats any leftover slices). If s1 + s2 > 8, then the players get nothing. Assume that you each care only about how much pizza you individually consume, and the more the better.What outcomes can be supported as pure-strategy Nash equilibria?
- The total cost for a product-testing firm is C(q)=70 + 20q2 q= number of products tested Price of a product = average cost Each corporation purchases one product test per year from a product-testing firm in the same city. All other inputs are ubiquitous. Suppose five corporations are initially distributed uniformly, with one corporation in each city (A,B,C,D,E). Is the initial distribution a Nash Equilibrium? Demonstrate it is not by finding how much one corporation would pay if they deviate and move to another city? What is the average price of having two tests conducted? (Which is the price that the corporation would pay if they "live" in a city where two tests are conducted) The average price of moving and thus, having two tests is: $_____Exercise 6.8. Two companies with cost functions C1 (q1 )=5q1 and C2 (q2)= 0.5 q2 ² supply the to the same market. If the inverse market demand function is given by P = 100 - 0,5Q , where Q = q₁ + q₂ , find a) The production level of each firm, the price and the profits if the companies compete according to the Cournot model. (b) The level of production of each undertaking, the price and the profits if the undertakings agree to jointly maximise their profits. Show the results with the help of graphs.Two manufacturers, denoted 1 and 2, are competing for 100 identical customers. Each manufacturer chooses both the price and quality of its product, where each variable can take any nonnegative real number. Let pi and xi denote, respectively, the price and quality of manufacturer i’s product. The cost to manufacturer i of producing for one customer is 10 + 5xi. Note in this expression that the cost is higher when the quality is higher. If manufacturer i sells to qi customers, then its total cost is qi(10 + 5xi). Each customer buys from the manufacturer who offers the greatest value, where the value of buying from manufacturer i is 1,000 + xi - pi; higher quality and lower price mean more value. A manufacturer’s payoff is its profit, which equals qi(pi - 10 - 5xi). If one manufacturer offers higher value, then all 100 customers buy from it. If both manufacturers offer the same value, then 50 customers buy from manufacturer 1 and the other 50 from manufacturer 2. Find all symmetric Nash…
- Melanie and Oli are competing Pacific halibut fishers. Both have been allocated ITQs that limit their catch to 1,000 tons of Pacific halibut each. Melanie's cost per ton is $20; Oli's cost per ton is $28.Refer to the information given and assume that the market price of Pacific halibut is $40 per ton. If Melanie pays Oli $10 per ton for his ITQs and then catches her new limit of 2,000 tons, their combined profit would be: $28,000. $32,000. $40,000. $54,000.Suppose we have two markets, A and B, each consisting of seven firms. The market shares of the 5 largest firms (ordered by market share) are shown in the table below. True or false? (i) The CR3 and CR4 concentration ratios both point to the same market (either A or B) having more market power. (ii) The 6th largest firm in market B captures at most 8 percent of the market. (iii) The HHI of market B is at most 1,798 (in units of squared percent). (Hint: for positive x and y, (x+y)2=x2+y2+2xy≥x2+y2.) (iv) The HHI of market A is definitely larger than the HHI of market B.The Able Manufacturing Company and Better Bettors, Inc. are rival firms in the production of a calculator used by horse racing fans for handicapping (determining betting strategies). Each firm has a fixed cost of $100 and a MC = $10 in producing calculators. The demand for the industry’s product is: Q = 900 – 5P, where P is the market price and Q = Q1 + Q2. If each firm must choose how many calculators to produce and sell without knowing of its rival’s production decision, what will be the Cournot equilibrium price and quantities produced? Calculate the profit for each firm.
- Economics - Game Theory & Business Strategy Inverse Market Demand for tires is P = 200 - .01Q We assume the manufacturer sets a Price, 'X', for the tires and the manufacrturer moves first, selecting 'X' before any sales decisions are made. In this variation, we assume there are 3 retail firms, each with Market Power. The firms (1,2,3) make their sales decisions (q1,q2,q3) simultaneously, taking the manufacturer's price X as given. Total market sales, Q, then equal q1 + q2 + q3. We assume the only cost for the retailers is the cost 'X' for each tire. Additionally, the manufacturer produces the tires at a Marginal Cost of $10 a tire. **** Write out the Extensive form of this game ****Joe and Rebecca are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolists. The market demand function is Qd = 10,000 – 100P, where P is the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Qd is the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is $25 per cubic yard. Suppose that Joe and Rebecca compete in quantities and competition in this market is described by Cournot model. What are Joe and Rebecca’s Nash equilibrium outputs? What is the resulting price? What do they each earn as profit? How does the price compare to the marginal cost? Joe and Rebecca are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolists. The market demand function is Qd = 10,000 – 100P, where P is the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Qd is the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is $25 per cubic yard. Suppose that Joe and Rebecca compete in quantities and competition in this market is described by Cournot model. What are Joe and Rebecca’s Nash equilibrium outputs? What is the resulting price? What do they each…Suppose that there are two firms in the market. The market demand is given by P=220 - 2Q, where Q is the total output (Q=Q1+Q2). Each firm has an identical cost function, TCi=8Qi, i=1, 2. Consider the collusion, in which they decide the output level together to maximize the joint profit. If they divide the production into half, then each firm should produce Qi= _______ units in order to maximize the joint profit.