Which of the following is NOT a requirement for a market to be perfectly competitive? There must be perfect information, so that buyers and sellers know everything they need to make aninformed decision.There must be no barriers to entry, so that anyone may buy or sell in the market.There must be many buyers and sellers, so that none of them have market power.There must be no externalities, so that buyers and sellers realize all the benefits and costs of the good in themarket.O There must be heterogeneous goods, so that buyers and sellers have a choice of product characteristics.

DWL is the loss in social welfare due to market power.

) There must be perfect information, so that buyers and sellers know everything they need to make ar informed decision. O There must be no barriers to entry, so that anyone may buy or sell in the market. O There must be many buyers and sellers, so that none of them have market power. O There must be no externalities, so that buyers and sellers realize all the benefits and costs of the goc market. O There must be heterogeneous goods, so that buyers and sellers have a choice of product characteris

) There must be perfect information, so that buyers and sellers know everything they need to make ar informed decision. O There must be no barriers to entry, so that anyone may buy or sell in the market. O There must be many buyers and sellers, so that none of them have market power. O There must be no externalities, so that buyers and sellers realize all the benefits and costs of the goc market. O There must be heterogeneous goods, so that buyers and sellers have a choice of product characteris

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305585126

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4PA

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